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1Executive summary
Introduction
The 2016 European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) report 
provides evidence of the employment impact of recent 
restructuring activity in Europe, based on the European 
Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the ERM events 
database.
Employment growth in the EU28 has been accelerating 
since 2013, and 3.5 million net new jobs were added in 
the 12 months to the first quarter of 2016. This rate of 
employment growth (1.6% per annum) has not been seen 
since 2007–2008. In line with the EU-LFS data, the ERM 
now shows for the first time since 2008 that announced 
job creation was greater than announced job destruction. 
The report provides details on sectors creating and losing 
jobs, with some focus on the retail trade, the eastward 
shift of motor vehicle manufacture in Europe, and the 
employment impact of mergers in financial services.
The thematic focus of this year’s report is on recent 
trends in both the offshoring and the reshoring activity of 
companies in Europe.
Policy context
The impact of globalisation on employment has 
become highly prominent in the political debate in 
both Europe and the United States. Facts and figures 
on this phenomenon are essential for evidence-based 
political discourse and as a basis for policy initiatives. The 
European Union conducts all international trade policy on 
behalf of the Member States. It is in this context that the 
most specific restructuring policy instrument at EU level, 
the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), was 
established in 2006. The EGF provides support to workers 
who lose their jobs as a result of major structural changes 
in world trade patterns due to globalisation – for example, 
when a large company shuts down or production is moved 
outside the EU, or as a result of the global economic and 
financial crisis.
Key findings
Just as the negative effects of globalisation on 
employment take centre stage of the political debate, it is 
surprising to observe that the rapid rise of globalisation, 
which was so striking in the two decades preceding the 
recession of 2008, has since abated significantly. Recent 
data show that the global rebound of growth was not 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in international 
trade and that some indicators of activity in global value 
chains have declined.
The ERM captures announced job loss due to the 
offshoring of jobs to other countries both within and 
outside the EU. According to the ERM data, this has never 
been a large source of job loss, despite dire predictions 
that a very large number of jobs in Europe and elsewhere 
in the developed world were potentially offshorable. 
Between 2003 and 2007, offshoring accounted for 7% of 
all announced job loss in the ERM. This declined to 4% in 
the depths of the recession (2008–2010) and continued to 
decline to under 3% in 2015–2016.
In manufacturing, the largest sector by far exposed 
to offshoring, the annual number of offshoring cases 
reported after 2010 is less than half of that reported 
prior to the crisis. The share of restructuring job loss in 
manufacturing accounted for by offshoring has declined 
from 12% to 8%. Fears expressed at the turn of the century 
of possible future huge job loss in Europe due to offshoring 
in the service sectors have simply not materialised. 
Offshoring in services and other sectors has remained well 
below that of manufacturing and has continually declined. 
In 2016, offshoring continued to be dominated by the 
manufacturing sector.
There is evidence of a shift of the locus of offshoring 
from western to eastern Europe. Offshoring has become 
an increasingly important aspect of restructuring in the 
13 Member States that joined the EU in or after 2004 
(the EU13). While the share of manufacturing job loss 
attributable to offshoring has halved in the pre-2004 
Member States (the EU15), from 14% to 7% between 2003–
2007 and 2015–2016, it has increased by a factor of four 
in the EU13 (from 4% to 15%). From the EU13, the main 
destinations of offshoring are to near Europe, North Africa 
as well as Asian countries including, but by no means 
confined to, China. The main motivation would appear to 
be lower labour costs.
Three manufacturing subsectors account for around 
60% of offshoring job losses: production of motor 
vehicles, electronics (such as televisions, computers 
and mobile phones) and electrical products (such as 
domestic appliances). While the large Member States – 
France, Germany and the UK – as well as Sweden 
dominate in terms of absolute offshoring job losses, the 
share of offshoring activity is relatively much higher in 
some smaller EU15 Member States (Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland and Portugal), where it accounts for over 20% of 
restructuring job losses (compared to less than 10% in the 
large Member States).
The reshoring of previously offshored jobs has generated 
some interest in recent years. No Member State has any 
systematic measure of how many jobs are involved. 
However, it appears to be a relatively minor phenomenon. 
While there may have been some signs of an increase 
in reshoring in the early days of the recession, there 
is no indication that it has continued to rise. Some 
representative evidence from German manufacturing 
shows that the most important reason given for reshoring 
was to obtain a higher degree of operational flexibility. 
Quality was the next most cited reason, followed by 
capacity. The report contains many examples of cases 
from European countries that report these reasons but 
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also some with more emphasis on shifts in the relative 
wage and transport costs between Europe and abroad.
Conclusions
There is emerging evidence that the pace of globalisation 
has abated. Other research has shown a significant decline 
in the trade elasticity of growth and some indication 
of lower activity in global value chains. This year’s ERM 
annual report adds another piece of evidence going in the 
same direction. Both the number of offshoring cases and 
the associated job losses are, even as the global economy 
has picked up, appreciably below the pre-crisis levels and 
continue to decline. While global uncertainties may still 
dampen offshoring investment, it may also be the case 
that the two decades that preceded the crisis of 2008 were 
exceptional periods in the history of globalisation. The 
sudden large entry of many countries with very limited 
trade and foreign direct investment, most notably China 
and the eastern European states, into the world trading 
system was a one-off event. Since then, the pace of 
globalisation has slowed down.
The last decade has seen increased interest in the reshoring 
of economic activity previously offshored. Data on reshoring 
to Europe is much more limited than that of offshoring, 
which is captured by the ERM. However, a more systematic 
measurement of the employment implications of reshoring 
to Europe will be available with the first reporting of data 
from the recently initiated European Reshoring Monitor 
(http://reshoring.eurofound.europa.eu) in 2017.
3Introduction
The European Restructuring Monitor (ERM) deals with the 
labour market adjustment to structural change. It includes 
the restructuring events database, a key tool in monitoring 
the employment implications of structural change.1 
Created in 2002, this database has recorded more than 
21,000 restructuring cases to date. Since 2011, the ERM 
has also provided a database on national public support 
instruments for restructuring, which can help companies 
and workers to anticipate and manage restructuring.2 
The database currently provides information on almost 
400 national schemes. Furthermore, since 2013, the ERM 
database on restructuring-related legislation has given an 
overview of national regulations related to, for example, 
definitions of collective dismissal, dismissal procedures, 
and information and consultation requirements in 
restructuring.3 The latter two qualitative databases are 
updated every two years.
Chapter 1 of this report presents the recent salient 
trends in employment using the European Union Labour 
Force Survey (EU-LFS). It complements and exemplifies 
some of these trends with the announced job loss data 
from the ERM. Even though unemployment remains 
unacceptably high, EU employment levels have finally 
recovered to where they were before the global financial 
crisis. Per annum employment growth of 1.5%–1.6% in 
the most recent data is similar to that of the pre-crisis 
expansion. In addition, the increasing full-time share of 
employment growth confirms the increasing confidence 
in employers’ hiring decisions. The sectors in which 
employment was particularly badly affected during the 
crisis – construction and manufacturing – have begun 
to stabilise or grow modestly. Within manufacturing, in 
particular, employment has grown quite significantly in 
some high-tech sectors, notably the motor vehicle sector. 
This resilience is related in part at least to a significant and 
ongoing transfer of productive activity from western to 
eastern Europe, as evidence from the ERM confirms.
The ERM also highlights how intensive restructuring 
activity can be in some sectors where overall employment 
shifts have been relatively muted. The retail sector 
has experienced many major chain bankruptcies since 
Woolworths collapsed in 2008, culminating in over 30,000 
job losses in the closures of British Home Stores, V&D and 
Marinopoulos in 2016. At the same time, US online retailer 
Amazon has been the single company responsible for most 
cases of announced job creation since 2014.
The main sources of employment growth have been 
private services as the secular shift to services continues. 
The fastest-growing sector has been IT and information 
services, where the ERM demonstrates a strong regional 
clustering of business expansion since 2014, concentrated 
in the Kraków–Wrocław corridor in Poland and around the 
capital city zones of Dublin and Bucharest.
The remaining chapters of the report examine the highly 
topical issue of whether, after decades of ever-increasing 
globalisation, we may be observing its structural 
slowdown (Hoekman, 2016). Globalisation has significant 
implications for restructuring. Perhaps the most specific 
European-level restructuring tool in this context is the 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which was 
initiated to mitigate the effects of job losses in companies 
that suffered from the negative effects of international 
competition.
International trade declined sharply at the start of the 
recession (in fact, evidence of a slowdown pre-dates 
2008), as would have been expected, but more notably, 
it has not recovered apace with the global rebound in 
gross domestic product (GDP). There is much discussion 
in academic and policy circles about whether it is purely 
a cyclical phenomenon or whether more structural 
long-term forces are at work. Moreover, globalisation 
is not just a matter of trade. A prominent feature of 
recent international economic developments was the 
increased inclusion of foreign establishments in the 
value chains of European companies. Both deregulation 
(including, most notably, China’s entry into the World 
Trade Organization and the accession of several central 
and eastern European countries into the European Union) 
and information and communication (ICT) technologies 
facilitated this development. Since the 1990s, offshoring 
(when a company moves some part of its activity to 
another country) has been one prominent aspect of the 
international intertwining of supply chains and has raised 
much concern about employment prospects in Europe 
and other parts of the developed world (see, for example, 
Blinder, 2006).
Chapter 2 uses the ERM to present recent evidence of the 
employment implications of offshoring. Despite concerns 
about massive levels of job loss due to the practice in the 
future, there is a consensus in the research literature so 
far that it has accounted for a relatively small share of job 
destruction in developed economies, with estimates of 
between 1% and 10%, depending on how it is measured. 
One of the main findings from the analysis of ERM 
restructuring events data is that the offshoring share of 
job loss and the number of cases of companies offshoring 
started to decline after the global financial crisis and has 
yet to recover. In manufacturing, for example, which is by 
far the largest sector exposed to offshoring, the annual 
number of offshoring cases reported after 2010 is less 
than half of that reported prior to the crisis. The share of 
restructuring job loss in manufacturing accounted for by 
offshoring has declined from 12% to 8%. In services, the 
offshoring share of job loss is much lower and has also 
declined post crisis.
1 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/factsheets
2 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/support-instrument
3 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/legislation
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There is also evidence of a shift of the locus of offshoring 
from western to eastern Europe. While the EU13 (those 
Member States that joined the EU since 2004) is the major 
destination for offshored jobs within the EU, primarily 
from the higher-GDP, pre-2004 Member States (the 
EU15), offshoring has become an increasingly important 
dimension of restructuring in the newer Member States 
themselves. Here the destination countries are near 
Europe, North Africa and Asian countries, including, but 
by no means confined to, China. The main motivation for 
transferring activity is cost, especially lower labour costs.
Most of the offshoring appears to be motivated by the 
search for lower labour costs, as the vast majority of 
cases are from relatively high-labour-cost to low-labour-
cost countries. Three manufacturing subsectors account 
for around 60% of offshoring job losses: production 
of motor vehicles, electronics (such as computers 
and mobile phones) and electrical products (such as 
domestic electrical goods). While the large Member 
States dominate in terms of absolute offshoring job 
losses (France, Germany and the UK but also Sweden), 
the share of offshoring activity is relatively much higher 
in some smaller EU15 Member States (Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland and Portugal), where it accounts for over 20% of 
restructuring job losses (compared to less than 10% in 
the large Member States). The share of manufacturing 
job loss attributable to offshoring has halved in the EU15 
(from 14% in 2003–2007 to 7% in 2015–2016), while it has 
increased by a factor of four in the EU13.
Perhaps the most striking finding of this analysis is 
that there appears to have been a decline in offshoring 
activity from the EU manufacturing sector dating back 
to the onset of the global financial crisis. The average 
annual number of offshoring cases reported to the ERM 
has more than halved between the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods, and the level of resulting job losses has 
declined even more sharply. There are many potential 
factors behind this decline, but one explanation is that 
the ‘offshoring calculation’ – in terms of cost differentials, 
available offshoring destinations and so on – was uniquely 
favourable, especially for western European businesses, in 
the period from 1990 to 2007 and that the easy gains from 
offshoring were largely reaped by European businesses in 
that pre-crisis period.
Offshoring to foreign locations entails a significant 
investment for a company. Given the severity of the 
recession and its global reach, it is not surprising that 
the level of offshoring activity and related job losses 
declined. Companies were more reluctant to commit to 
risky investments in a context of business uncertainty. 
What is more difficult to explain, however, is that there is 
no indication that the recovery of GDP growth has led to 
a new wave of offshoring activity. As noted above, there 
has been a similar slowdown in international trade. The 
literature suggests that the major increase in trade in the 
decades up to the recession of 2008 may to some extent 
have been a one-off event attributable to the entry of 
eastern Europe and China into the market economy and 
that this would not lead to a sustained growth of trade in 
the long term. Similar factors may lie behind the lower rate 
of offshoring in the last decade.
Indeed, the last decade has seen much more interest in 
the return of economic activity to the country from which 
it had been offshored (reshoring). Data on the reshoring 
of economic activity back to Europe is much more 
limited than that of offshoring, which is captured by the 
ERM. However, a more systematic measurement of the 
employment implications of reshoring to Europe will be 
available with the first reporting of data from the recently 
initiated European Reshoring Monitor in 2017.4 This is part 
of a pilot project, the Future of Manufacturing in Europe, 
delegated by the European Commission to Eurofound. The 
methodology will be similar to that of the ERM in that it 
will be based on media sources. Unlike the ERM, however, 
it does not have a threshold for the employment effects in 
order to be a valid case for entry into the dataset (the ERM 
threshold is an announced loss or creation of at least 100 
jobs, or an employment impact affecting at least 10% of 
a workforce of more than 250 people).
Chapter 3 presents recent evidence on reshoring. The 
information is somewhat fragmented, even if surveys from 
Germany and the UK do provide some more representative 
trends. Most evidence is based on the collection of cases. 
Probably the firmest evidence is from Germany, where 
up to 2007, only 2% of the surveyed companies reported 
reshoring. This figure increased marginally at the start of 
the recession, but the most recent data show a return to 
the pre-crisis level. Reshoring was most prominent in the 
electrical equipment industry. In the German survey, the 
most important reason given for reshoring was to obtain 
a higher degree of operational flexibility and more control 
over the quality of manufacture. Quality was the reason 
cited the next most often, followed by capacity. Similar 
results were found for UK companies, but more emphasis 
was placed on shifts in the relative wage costs and 
increased transport costs. A highly ranked factor reported 
in Italian surveys was the importance of the ‘Made in Italy’ 
label.
Information on the number of jobs that may have been 
created in Europe as result of reshoring is extremely 
sparse. It would appear, however, that the positive effects 
are minor. The German data, for example, show that 
cases of offshoring are appreciably more frequent than 
reshoring – among manufacturing sectors, it is between 
3 and 10 times more frequent. The European Reshoring 
Monitor will provide a somewhat better figure, but a scan 
of the data collected so far appears to confirm the modest 
employment impact.
Overall, the evidence on offshoring and reshoring indicates 
a more modest global relocation of economic activity than 
in the public perception of these phenomena. Despite 
concerns about an impending wave of offshoring, prevalent 
at the start of the century, offshoring was always a relatively 
minor source of job loss in large-scale restructurings, 
and it has declined appreciably since the recession of 
2008. Moreover, speculation that major offshoring in 
service sectors was a credible scenario, due largely to the 
4 See the project website at http://reshoring.eurofound.europa.eu
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enabling role of advances in ICT, has not materialised; 
the manufacturing sector continues to dominate 
offshoring cases. While the ERM may not fully capture 
the phenomenon, the fact that offshoring is particularly 
prominent in larger companies may suggest that the ERM 
captures the extent of offshoring better than the other types 
of restructuring, where the 100-job-loss threshold is a more 
relevant limitation. Finally, while the basis for an estimation 
of the employment effects of reshoring is rather weak, the 
available evidence is that it is a minor phenomenon.
In conclusion, it should be underlined that reshoring and 
offshoring is a rather limited measure of the impact of 
global competitive forces on employment in Europe. Three 
decades ago, China–EU trade was practically non-existent, 
but today China is the major source of EU imports by 
far and a rapidly growing destination of EU exports. EU 
imports from China are mainly in the sectors of machinery 
and equipment, footwear and clothing, furniture and 
lamps, and toys. EU exports to China are predominantly 
in machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft and 
chemicals. While it is very difficult to trace the impact 
of this trade on the shifting structure of production in 
Europe, it is undoubtedly a highly significant factor and 
will account for much of the reallocation of employment 
throughout Europe.

71 Recent labour market and 
restructuring trends
Introduction
In this chapter, data from two sources – the EU-LFS and the 
ERM – are used to cast some light on recent labour market 
and restructuring developments in the EU. The EU-LFS is 
the standard data source for the main aggregate indicators 
of labour market performance, such as employment levels 
and rates, unemployment rates and shares of part-time 
work. The ERM tracks large-scale restructuring cases as 
reported in the press and media. The advantage of the ERM 
restructuring factsheets is that they relate to restructuring 
announcements in specific companies, with more detailed 
and concrete information about individual cases and some 
insights into the behaviour of the restructuring companies. 
As approximately 1,500 new cases are added to the database 
every year, trends in restructuring activity across cases can 
be identified, for example the decline in offshoring from EU 
Member States after the global financial crisis (Eurofound, 
2013). The approach of the current analysis is to foreground 
the main labour market trends, notably as regards shifts in 
the sectoral composition of employment, using the EU-LFS 
and then to illustrate some of the trends identified with the 
ERM restructuring data and cases.
For official labour market data, the analysis relies on the 
EU-LFS going back to the beginning of the first quarter (Q1) 
of 2008 and up to Q1 2016 in order to more clearly identify 
structural shifts in employment. Only in 2016 had aggregate 
EU employment recovered to levels last observed before 
the global financial crisis, so the timeframe encompasses 
something like a complete business cycle, including 
recession and recovery periods. More recent (2015–2016) 
individual ERM restructuring case examples illustrate some 
of the main emerging themes, such as shifts of motor 
vehicle production from western to eastern Europe and 
more intensive recent restructuring in the retail sector. 
This dataset is also used to highlight broader trends in 
restructuring activity over a longer period going back over 
10 years.
Background and general trends
Labour market conditions are improving. Employment 
growth in the EU28 has been accelerating since 2013, and 
3.5 million net new jobs were added in the 12 months 
to Q1 2016. This rate of employment growth (1.6% per 
annum) has not been seen since 2007–2008. The average 
EU unemployment rate has fallen to 8.6%, although an 
increasing differential between it and the euro zone rate 
(10.1% as of June 2016, according to Eurostat) confirms 
that the recovery has been slower in the single-currency 
zone. According to the most recent unemployment 
data (Q1 2016), only 1 of the 28 Member States, Austria, 
recorded a year-on-year increase in its unemployment 
rate, and that was from a low level.
The recovery to pre-crisis employment levels involves 
different trajectories across Member States. In the UK and 
Germany, employment has increased significantly since 
2008 despite the slump, adding some 2 million and 2.8 
million net new jobs, respectively. In Spain, on the other 
hand, there are 2.8 million fewer people in employment 
in Q1 2016 compared to Q1 2008, notwithstanding strong 
growth since 2014, which has seen some one million net 
new jobs created and the unemployment rate falling below 
20% (as of June 2016). In Greece, there are one million 
fewer people in employment in 2016 compared to before 
the crisis – a wrenching 21% contraction of the workforce.
When compared internationally, the post-2013 recovery 
in EU labour markets is less impressive. It has taken eight 
years to achieve in aggregate what the US labour market 
achieved in less than five years (in other words, return 
to pre-crisis employment headcounts). Unemployment 
remains very high by comparison with both Japan and 
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in the euro zone, the EU, Japan and the US, 2008–2016
EU Euro zone United States Japan 
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the United States, as Figure 1 demonstrates. Since 2011, 
the divergence in unemployment rates between the euro 
zone countries and the US has grown from less than one 
percentage point to over five percentage points.
One important and unheralded area in which EU 
labour markets have proven more resilient is level of 
participation. In the US in particular, a major public policy 
concern has been the post-crisis decline in participation, 
as people of working age have dropped out of the 
labour market altogether and are no longer seeking 
work (‘discouraged workers’). This has been much less 
of a concern in Europe, where participation rates were 
stable during the crisis slump years (2008–2011) and have 
steadily risen since then, from 71.0% to 72.9% in 2008 to 
2015 in the EU28; by comparison, the US rates fell from 
75.3% to 72.6% in the same period. In Germany and the 
UK, participation rates were almost five percentage points 
higher than in the US in 2015. So while people of working 
age are more likely to be unemployed in the EU, they are 
more likely to be inactive and out of the labour market 
altogether in the US.
Beyond the headline indicators of employment levels and 
rates, the composition of employment has altered since 
2008. Shares of EU aggregate employment have changed 
considerably by country as a result of the divergent effects 
of the crisis at national level, as already noted. The gender 
employment gap has closed further, as women tended to 
work in relatively sheltered sectors (health and education), 
while men were overrepresented in more exposed sectors 
(construction and manufacturing). These sectoral shifts 
also meant that the impacts fell heaviest on blue-collar 
and low-skilled workers.
But the two most important shifts have been in terms 
of working time (full time and part time) and the age 
composition of employment. Younger workers represent 
a much-reduced share of the workforce and older workers 
(55 years and older, and increasingly 65 years and older) 
represent a greater share. This has happened because 
young people were more vulnerable to job loss during 
the crisis and have also found it difficult to access jobs in 
a context of depressed demand in its wake. Older workers, 
by contrast, have been more likely to remain in work for 
a combination of pull and push reasons, such as relatively 
greater employment protections based on tenure, 
restricted early retirement possibilities, increasing pension 
age thresholds, less generous pension entitlements, 
wealth asset reduction during the crisis, improved work 
capability and longevity. In Q1 2016, those aged over 50 
accounted for over 31% of EU employment (compared to 
25% in Q1 2008), while those aged 15–24 accounted for 
only 8% (compared to 10% in Q1 2008).
The other major shift has been from full-time to part-
time employment. Part-time employment has grown by 
some five million between 2008 and 2016, while full-time 
employment has contracted by almost the same amount. 
As Figure 2 shows, part-time employment was largely 
impervious to the crisis and has continued to grow by on 
average 600,000 jobs per year, with only modest variation 
year to year. By contrast, the stock of full-time employment 
suffered the full impact of the crisis. It contracted every 
quarter from late 2008 until late 2013 and particularly 
sharply in the core crisis period.
In some ways, the most dependable indicator of employer 
confidence is their decision to hire a full-time (and 
permanent) worker. The recent recovery starting in 2013 
coincides with a period in which net full-time employment 
has begun to grow again in the EU. More recently, in 
2015–2016, levels of full-time employment have expanded 
much more sharply compared to part-time levels. These 
are positive signals.
Figure 2: Part-time and full-time employment growth (in thousands) in the EU, quarterly year on year, Q1 2008–Q1 2015
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Sectoral employment shifts
The crisis and post-crisis periods have also affected the 
composition of employment by sector. Figure 3 compares 
sectoral employment growth rates in the post-crisis 
employment contraction (2008–2013) and the more recent 
period of recovery (2013–2016).
Four clusters can be identified: 
¢ Agriculture: This sector sustained continuing secular 
employment decline of just over 2% per annum 
in both periods. Most of these losses (about 1.4 
million out of a total 2 million decline in headcount) 
occurred in just three countries – Romania, Poland 
and Portugal – each with relatively high shares of 
agricultural employment.
¢ Manufacturing and construction: These sectors 
contracted sharply in the crisis and post-crisis periods, 
but employment levels have stabilised in construction 
and have risen modestly in manufacturing since 2013.
¢ Stagnant or slow-growing service sectors: Such 
sectors exist both in the private sector (retail, transport 
and finance) and public sector (public administration).
¢ Structurally growing, generally high-skill, service 
sectors: Employment in these sectors grew during 
the crisis, and growth has strengthened since 2013. 
The most important of these in terms of overall 
employment are the predominantly state-funded 
sectors of health and education, although there 
is widespread evidence of an increasing private 
share of employment in these sectors, notably in 
the health sector (Eurofound, 2015). There has also 
been sustained employment growth in the broad 
categories of professional services (legal, computing 
and information technology (IT), accounting, 
engineering and management consultancy) as well 
as administrative services (employment, security, 
travel and building maintenance). These sectors 
tend to be labour intensive and require higher skills. 
In addition, most work comprises tasks that are not 
trivial enough to automate and thereby replace with 
technology. Of note, employment growth has been 
faster in private services than predominantly state-
funded services since 2013, partly as a consequence of 
fiscal consolidation and public spending restrictions 
during and following the euro zone crisis of 2011–
2013. Nonetheless, given their size, the health and 
education sectors in particular have contributed to the 
recovery in employment headcount.
Table 1a shows, by Member State, the top six sectors in 
which employment declined most in the period from Q1 
2008 to Q1 2016 (Table 2a further down shows the top six 
sectors in which employment grew in that period).
Figure 3: EU employment growth per annum by sector, comparing 2008–2013 with 2013–2016
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Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)
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Table 1a: Top six employment-losing sectors, by Member State, 2008–2016
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Germany Denmark
46 -24.2 64 -52.4 41 -69.5 41 -14.6 43 -106.1 96 -221.9 41 -43.9
41 -20.1 29 -31.4 1 -57.5 97 -4.7 46 -32.1 78 -221.3 84 -27.7
45 -15.8 84 -28.4 14 -54.7 43 -4.5 49 -29.1 1 -182.9 43 -22.2
1 -13.4 97 -24.4 85 -42.0 64 -4.0 33 -19.6 25 -164.6 47 -18.3
42 -12.7 1 -23.2 84 -35.5 1 -2.1 13 -17.0 65 -113.8 49 -15.9
64 -12.6 20 -21.8 43 -27.7 79 -1.9 88 -15.0 61 -95.1 28 -14.8
Estonia Croatia Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland
41 -18.8 1 -77.2 46 -18.4 97 -316.9 43 -147.6 47 -33.0 41 -64.2
43 -10.3 41 -32.6 26 -14.6 84 -255.6 41 -106.6 43 -18.1 43 -58.9
46 -8.0 46 -19.3 17 -14.4 43 -163.4 1 -66.2 45 -13.8 46 -20.2
10 -5.8 47 -10.2 1 -12.8 29 -103.3 46 -65.2 71 -12.2 47 -20.2
85 -5.3 10 -9.0 84 -9.0 28 -50.1 47 -59.4 26 -11.6 25 -9.3
14 -4.8 14 -9.0 16 -8.4 94 -45.8 84 -52.3 27 -11.5 1 -7.7
Italy Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Netherlands Poland
41 -323.6 41 -44.9 41 -2.7 41 -49.0 55 -2.6 69 -135.9 1 -439.8
46 -309.2 47 -23.3 45 -2.5 47 -24.5 41 -2.0 84 -81.0 14 -102.9
43 -151.0 43 -16.5 22 -2.1 84 -24.3 30 -2.0 1 -68.1 43 -71.1
33 -122.5 14 -14.7 51 -2.0 46 -18.3 27 -1.0 41 -65.1 46 -66.1
84 -118.6 35 -10.2 46 -1.4 1 -12.6 26 -1.0 43 -51.9 37 -44.3
14 -94.6 16 -8.3 10 -1.4 42 -10.0 61 -0.9 88 -45.7 13 -31.7
Portugal Romania Sweden Slovenia Slovakia Spain UK
1 -274.6 1 -681.0 25 -24.1 1 -32.8 41 -24.2 41 -1104.5 43 -1336.1
41 -209.8 14 -103.1 87 -18.7 14 -8.7 1 -17.8 43 -460.1 84 -222.3
97 -66.2 43 -67.1 72 -16.2 84 -6.9 14 -17.4 25 -159.4 64 -187.9
43 -59.6 16 -53.2 28 -14.7 16 -6.6 27 -12.5 47 -158.4 69 -178.1
56 -48.8 24 -47.2 29 -12.5 49 -5.8 26 -12.3 23 -124.5 52 -166.8
84 -48.6 35 -42.0 16 -8.8 20 -5.7 65 -11.9 97 -124.3 47 -134.1
Table 1b: Summary of employment-losing sectors by number of occurrences in the Member State listings
NACE code Sector Total no. of 
occurrences
41 Construction 17
43 Specialised construction activities 17
1 Agriculture 16
84 Public administration, defence and social security 12
46 Wholesale except motor vehicles 11
14 Manufacture: clothing 9
47 Retail except motor vehicles 9
16 Manufacture: wood products 5
97 Domestic services 5
25 Manufacture: fabricated metal products 4
26 Manufacture: computer, electronic and optical 4
64 Financial services except insurance/pensions 4
Notes: See Annex 1 for a full sector listing and a guide to sectors corresponding to NACE codes. A large ‘unspecified’ sector is omitted from ranking 
lists for France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Regarding the UK, losses in NACE 43 are exaggerated following reclassification within construction 
sectors NACE 41–43.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)
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The construction sector figures prominently in the list 
of top job-loss sectors across the Member States. It has 
shed some four million jobs since Q1 2008 and has only 
very recently begun to grow again at aggregate level. This 
is a labour-intensive and cycle-sensitive sector, so it is 
perhaps surprising that there was not an earlier bounce in 
employment.
One probable explanation is that the scale of the pre-
crisis boom in certain Member States was so great and so 
unsustainable that there has been a negative adjustment 
to more customary, durable levels of employment in the 
sector. This is borne out by Figure 4, which shows the 
employment shares of construction by country in 2008, 
at or just after the height of the pre-crisis construction 
boom in those countries that had one, and in 2016. 
There has been a decline in the share of employment 
in nearly all Member States, but the decline has been 
markedly greater where the pre-crisis construction share 
was greater. Spain is the most extreme case, with over 
1.6 million construction job losses, where its share of 
employment has declined from 13% to 6%. However, 
sharp drops were experienced in all countries where 
the construction sector had grown to account for over 
8%–10% of total employment, including the Baltic 
states, Cyprus and Ireland. In all Member States where 
unemployment rose most sharply after the global financial 
crisis, a common factor was the bursting of a real estate 
bubble and the resulting destruction of construction 
sector employment. As such boom–busts were also 
a significant proximate cause of financial sector collapses, 
with knock-on consequences for state finances, these are 
also the Member States that were compelled to rely on 
external funding assistance in the post-crisis period from 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).5 A high construction 
employment share compared to the country average over 
time or against the EU average has been an important 
manifestation of unsustainable credit conditions and 
misallocation of capital, with the destructive economic 
consequences witnessed in some Member States.
As an aside, it is perhaps surprising to note that the 
construction share of employment has risen since 2008 in 
only one Member State, Belgium.
Other sectors that figure prominently in the country top 
six lists of job loss include retail, agriculture, various 
manufacturing subsectors as well as public administration. 
There has been significant rationalisation in the 
competitive and low-margin retail sector, as evidenced in 
the level of restructuring activity recorded in the ERM. This 
has resulted in the consolidation of retail activity in larger 
units but also the disappearance of many high street retail 
jobs altogether.
Figure 4: Employment share of construction in 2008 and 2016, by Member State
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5 For more information, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/financial-assistance-eurozone-members/
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Box 1: Retail – Major chain collapses
Based on EU-LFS data, the large retail sector in the EU was characterised as one of a group of slow-growth service sectors. 
The sector accounts for some 31 million workers, or around 15% of the EU workforce, but has contracted since 2008 
(losing 400,000 workers). This apparent stagnation evidenced in the aggregate net employment shifts conceals high levels 
of restructuring activity at company level that the ERM shows and can help to explain.
After manufacturing, retail accounts for the highest number of restructuring cases in the overall ERM database (over 
1,200) and for around one in six announced job gains and job losses reported during 2015–2016. A distinctive feature 
of restructuring in the sector is the relatively high share of job loss attributable to bankruptcy or closure, indicative of 
relatively unconstrained, competitive market forces. It is the only sector in which bankruptcy accounts for over half of all 
announced job losses. A combination of high levels of competition (especially from online retailers), changing consumer 
taste, narrow margins and increasing cross-border market penetration have been some of the factors cited in a series of 
collapses in the first half of 2016.
In three cases alone, over 30,000 jobs were lost. The troubled Dutch department store and chain V&D closed with the loss 
of at least 8,000 jobs after being declared bankrupt on the last day of 2015. The 128-year-old chain had around 250 outlets 
nationally. Some of the stores continued to operate until February 2016, but attempts to salvage the company through 
third-party intervention were unsuccessful. Subsequently, Canadian company HBC (Hudson’s Bay Company) announced 
it would take over some 20 of the former V&D sites starting in summer 2017. This could involve up to 2,500 new jobs being 
created.
In June 2016, the UK chain British Home Stores (BHS) also declared bankruptcy, with the likely loss of 11,000 jobs. The 
company, which operated 160 stores across the UK, had entered administration in April 2016, but, again, no buyer was 
found for the heavily indebted business. The first store closures were initiated in July 2016, with over 1,000 redundancies 
implemented at the time of writing.
A UK parliamentary enquiry was called into the closure of BHS and into the company’s huge pension deficit (over GBP 500 
million) at the time of its bankruptcy (€580 million as at 11 November 2016). The company was part of the Arcadia Group 
from 2000 to 2015, producing dividends of around GBP 580 million (€674 million) in that period for Arcadia Group’s owner, 
UK retail magnate Sir Philip Green and family. In 2015, it was sold for a minimal consideration to a company called Retail 
Acquisitions. The case has raised debate about corporate governance in the company and also on policy issues in relation 
to securing pension funds for the benefit of company workers – which is especially important in older companies like BHS 
(founded in 1928) – and the administration process, which shop workers’ trade union USDAW insist is too geared towards 
the interest of company creditors and insufficiently so towards the interests of the company itself and its workforce.
Finally, in late June 2016, Marinopoulos, one of the largest supermarket chains in Greece, with over 400 outlets, filed for 
bankruptcy. Though the business continued operating under administrative protection from creditors, 13,000 employees 
faced the prospect of redundancy in the heavily indebted company. In 1999, the family-owned business entered a 50–50 
joint venture with the French Carrefour Group, becoming the largest retail presence in Greece. This was reported to be 
a profitable business operation until 2012, when Carrefour decided to withdraw from the partnership due to the economic 
slump associated with the Greek debt crisis.
Counterbalancing these job losses in established, traditional retailers, and also recorded by the ERM, is the international 
expansion of low-cost retailers with significant new job creation. For example, German group Aldi announced 8,000 new 
jobs in 2015 as it prepares to almost double its store total in the UK.
Perhaps more importantly, there has been a notable expansion of its European workforce by the world’s largest online 
retailer, Amazon – an indication of the structural shift from high street, more labour-intensive retail provision to online 
sales. Amazon created 10,000 new jobs in its European operations in 2015 and announced a further 3,000 in 2016. It now 
employs over 40,000 people in the EU, and around one-third of these are in the UK. It is responsible for 4 of the10 largest 
retail ERM job creation cases recorded in 2015–2016.
At the same time that the US company has embarked on a large expansion of its warehouse ‘fulfilment centres’ in the EU, 
it has also begun to roll out a new generation of robots that are increasingly performing the work of and replacing the 
need for human ‘pickers and packers’. It is reported that over 30,000 Kiva robots are currently in deployment worldwide in 
Amazon units. Such developments can only add to the commercial pressures already felt by more traditional ‘bricks and 
mortar’ retailers.
Services dominate the job-gaining sector lists (Table 2). 
Health and education – two big, predominantly state-
funded sectors – are amongst the top-growing sectors in 
over half of the Member States. In Portugal, where three 
of the top six growing sectors are health-related (NACE 
86–88), the health service announced in February 2015 
the recruitment of 2,000 nursing professionals and more 
than 1,900 specialised doctors. This was the biggest single 
announced expansion in the sector recorded on the ERM 
since 2015.
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Table 2a: Top six employment-gaining sectors, by Member State, 2008–2016
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
NACE 
code
Job 
loss 
(000s)
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep Germany Denmark
85 62.8 88 68.8 62 19.8 56 4.0 29 70.3 85 401.5 85 48.3
62 31.4 81 55.0 80 18.3 69 3.5 85 40.4 46 368.4 81 28.3
86 28.5 43 51.2 69 18.0 86 2.5 86 35.8 81 356.1 78 18.7
88 24.9 85 37.7 47 16.1 66 2.1 62 34.7 86 340.2 56 18.6
87 24.7 87 31.8 81 14.6 85 1.6 98 32.5 87 292.4 21 17.8
27 23.4 78 31.0 29 10.0 52 1.1 71 31.8 28 265.3 42 14.6
Estonia Croatia Finland France Greece Hungary Ireland
62 14.0 85 28.3 86 17.2 88 390.0 56 11.2 84 174.1 62 16.9
86 7.3 86 13.8 87 13.3 86 236.5 58 10.2 29 72.9 85 14.2
84 4.2 69 10.2 93 9.6 85 186.7 65 8.5 1 40.4 86 12.0
61 3.5 45 9.3 62 9.0 70 144.0 82 7.0 56 32.1 88 10.7
60 3.3 96 9.1 81 6.2 56 131.3 62 4.1 88 25.9 56 8.0
82 2.8 62 9.1 74 6.0 47 114.2 93 3.8 81 25.5 21 5.8
Italy Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Malta Netherlands Poland
97 378.4 49 14.4 64 9.6 68 17.1 85 5.9 70 91.6 84 100.4
56 167.5 46 12.9 69 5.2 50 6.0 47 3.7 78 78.0 47 99.1
81 100.5 78 9.3 85 4.4 96 5.6 86 3.4 46 73.4 45 84.7
10 92.0 84 8.0 43 3.6 64 4.4 64 2.8 81 50.8 86 84.3
87 77.5 70 6.8 88 3.4 87 3.9 84 2.5 74 28.1 41 69.5
86 72.7 71 6.1 86 2.5 65 3.9 56 2.4 33 25.1 62 67.9
Portugal Romania Sweden Slovenia Slovakia Spain UK
86 58.5 45 57.6 85 69.6 29 11.9 84 61.0 86 152.6 85 665.6
85 55.9 29 52.2 84 68.7 56 7.1 29 36.3 85 119.2 41 652.9
87 47.4 69 51.6 70 49.4 86 6.8 62 23.8 62 65.7 87 493.2
62 26.1 49 48.3 88 40.7 47 5.2 88 23.4 87 63.3 56 309.5
82 21.3 80 45.5 71 33.3 87 5.1 47 21.1 93 62.1 81 295.2
88 16.8 97 36.9 62 26.2 21 4.8 81 11.1 56 53.3 70 285.7
Table 2b: Summary of employment-gaining sectors by number of occurrences in the Member State listings
NACE code Sector Total no. of occurrences
86 Health 16
85 Education 15
62 Computer programming, consultancy, etc. 13
56 Food and beverage services 11
81 Building services and landscaping 10
87 Residential care 10
88 Social work 9
84 Public administration, defence and social security 7
29 Manufacture: motor vehicles 6
47 Retail except motor vehicles 6
69 Legal and accounting activities 5
70 Head office, management consultancy activities 5
78 Employment activities 4
21 Manufacture: pharmaceuticals 3
45 Wholesale/retail of motor vehicles, etc. 3
46 Wholesale except motor vehicles 3
64 Financial services except insurance/pensions 3
71 Architectural and engineering activities 3
82 Office and business support activities 3
93 Sports and recreation 3
Notes:  See Annex 1 for full sector listing and a guide to sectors corresponding to NACE codes. A large ‘unspecified’ sector is omitted from ranking lists 
for France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Regarding the UK, gains in NACE 41 are exaggerated following reclassification of employment 
within construction sectors NACE 41–43.
Source: EU-LFS (authors’ elaboration)
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Both health and education are labour intensive, relatively 
high skilled and tend to be expanding structurally in 
developed economies. This has occurred for a variety of 
reasons. In relation to health, demographic ageing leads 
to greater demand for provision. Also, the share of health 
services in overall consumption expands as societies 
become better off. Finally, health provision, like education, 
is still largely dependent on human interaction, resulting 
in limited potential productivity gains from technological 
advances of the type that have made agriculture and 
manufacturing much more productive with a much 
reduced workforce (Baumol, 1993). Developments in 
telemedicine (or the emergence of online education, 
including ‘massive online open courses’, or MOOCs) 
may alter this assessment in the near future, but much 
healthcare provision remains largely traditional, human-
interactive and labour intensive.
Demographic ageing is even more directly responsible 
for the growth of employment in residential care, which 
is among the fastest-growing sectors, and may also have 
contributed to growth in social work.
Computer programming and consultancy is a core 
knowledge-intensive services sector and appears in the list 
of top-growing sectors in nearly half the Member States. 
It has been the fastest-growing sector in employment 
terms – despite its relatively small share of overall 
employment – in Bulgaria, Estonia and Ireland. This is 
reflected in the ERM, where the overwhelming majority 
of recent restructuring cases in the sector (NACE 62) have 
been of business expansion (119 out of a total of 135 
cases since January 2015). It is also the sector with the 
highest ratio of restructuring job gains to job losses (over 
six gained for every one lost). Two countries, Poland and 
Ireland, account for over half of the business expansions 
reported by the ERM in 2015–2016, with 47 cases and 20 
cases, respectively. Common features of the computer and 
IT sector cases in the two countries are that they involve 
a high share of skilled, graduate-level jobs (programmers, 
IT consultants, business analysts, engineers, and 
marketing and sales specialists), are the result of foreign 
direct investment by multinationals based in other 
countries, and are geographically concentrated in specific 
areas of each country.
The capital region around Dublin attracts the lion’s 
share of the business expansions in the sector in Ireland. 
The biggest cases most recently have been those of US 
multinationals Amazon, with 500 new jobs announced in 
May 2016 (Dublin is Amazon’s technical hub in Europe), 
and Oracle, with 450 new sales jobs in cloud computing 
announced in January 2016. In Poland, most expansion 
cases are based in the geographical triangle formed by 
Wrocław, Kraków and Katowice in the south-west of the 
country. Wrocław in particular has benefitted from some 
of the biggest recent employment-generating investments. 
Dutch enterprise software company Unit4 announced the 
opening of an R&D centre in March 2015 (700 jobs), Swiss 
bank UBS announced a new shared services centre in the 
city (600 jobs) in January 2016, while IBM and Infor each 
announced 500 new jobs in April 2016 in, respectively, 
shared services and cloud computing services. The job 
profiles for these new or expanding facilities in Poland 
tend to emphasise language capabilities in addition to 
technical expertise, reflecting the fact that the facilities 
serve diverse national markets either in Europe or the 
Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) zone.
Since the onset of the crisis in 2008, the largest declines 
in employment have taken place in manufacturing 
(-3.7 million jobs), construction (-3.9 million jobs) and 
agriculture (-2 million jobs). In terms of balancing gains, 
six sectors have recorded net employment growth of over 
1 million jobs: residential care and social work activities 
(+1.9 million), health services (+1.3 million), education 
(+1.6 million), administrative and support services 
(+1.4 million), high-level professional services, such as 
legal, accounting and engineering services, (+1.2 million) 
and accommodation and food services (+1 million). These 
are all service sectors and the majority of service sectors 
continued to add employment. There were some notable 
exceptions, however, including core government functions 
(public administration and defence), which suffered a 2% 
decline, and the telecommunications sector, which has 
shed almost a quarter of its pre-crisis employment. Growth 
was fastest in IT and information services (+31%), other 
professional, scientific and technical activities (+27%) as 
well as residential care and social work activities (23%).
Within the manufacturing sector, three clusters can be 
identified. Employment losses have been most severe 
(more than 25% of total employment) in basic, low-tech 
subsectors such as textiles, clothing and leather; wood, 
paper and printing; as well as, more recently, coke and 
petroleum products, where the collapse of oil prices since 
Q1 2014 (from over USD 100 a barrel to USD 45 a barrel in 
mid-2016) has led to much internal restructuring in the 
sector. More modest employment losses (10%–16%) have 
been recorded in the production of rubber and plastic 
goods as well as basic metals, computers and electrical 
goods.
Finally, the remaining predominantly high-tech 
manufacturing sectors (motor vehicles, machinery and 
pharmaceuticals) have recovered the employment losses 
experienced at the outset of the crisis and have posted 
marginal positive employment gains over the period 
2008–2016. As is clear from Table 2 above, motor vehicle 
manufacturing employment gains have been concentrated 
in central and eastern Europe; it has been one of the 
top two growing sectors for employment in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia since 
2008. This follows extensive investment before and after 
EU accession by predominantly large EU motor vehicle 
manufacturers exploiting lower wage costs, developed 
skill bases and, in some cases, existing infrastructure in 
the more industrialised regions of the former Eastern Bloc 
countries of the Soviet Union.
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Box 2: Manufacturing – Motor vehicle employment moves east
As already indicated, employment shifts have been highly differentiated across manufacturing subsectors. Some 
traditional, low-tech sectors such as wood, paper, textiles and clothing continue to contract rapidly in terms of 
employment headcount. High-tech sectors such as pharmaceuticals have added employment. However, the most 
important high-tech sectors – motor vehicle and transport equipment manufacture – have recovered the job losses 
experienced during the global financial crisis and now employ some 150,000 more workers than in 2008. ERM 
restructuring cases in the sector have recorded two job gains for every one job lost since the beginning of 2014. Most 
new employment in the sector is concentrated in eastern Europe, as existing, mainly western European, multinationals 
nearshore production to lower-cost facilities in the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania in particular.
As Figure 5 confirms, the largest net restructuring losses 
in the motor vehicle sector have all been in older, EU15 
Member States. Net gains at country level have been 
confined to eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the two largest 
cases of announced job creation in 2015–2016 were in 
Germany, the powerhouse of the European motor vehicle 
sector. In 2015, luxury marques BMW and Audi announced 
5,000 and 4,000 new jobs, respectively, in their German 
operations, as well as several thousand further new jobs 
in international units. BMW was seeking specialists in the 
areas of alternative power units, light construction and IT. 
Audi, which belongs to the Volkswagen Group, employs 
approximately 80,000 people worldwide and grew its 
workforce by nearly 6,000 in 2014. By 2019, it plans to 
invest €24 billion in new technologies for production 
as well as in the construction of new production plants 
worldwide.
In March 2016, car manufacturer Skoda Auto (another 
subsidiary of the Volkswagen Group) announced that it 
would add 2,000 new jobs at its Kvasiny plant in the Czech 
Republic during 2016 due to the launch of two new sport 
utility vehicles (Skoda SUV and Seat SUV). The site already 
employs 5,000 staff. A new Volkswagen Poznan site, 
operational in late 2016 at Września, should employ 1,500 
staff producing the Crafter van.
It is not just car manufacturers that have shifted eastwards, 
but also the related supply chain. In February 2016, the 
French car parts manufacturer Faurecia, which produces 
car components for most of the major marques operating 
in the EU, announced the creation of 1,000 jobs at a new, 
sixth Slovakian plant at Lozorno. In May 2016, the company 
began production of car upholstery at a new Romanian 
plant near Râmnicu Vâlcea following an investment of €12 
million. This plant, the company’s fourth in Romania, will 
employ 1,600 people.
Overall, since January 2015, 24 of the 33 cases of 
announced large-scale job creation (involving at least 500 
new jobs) in the motor vehicle and transport equipment 
sectors have related to facilities in eastern Europe.
Figure 5: Announced job losses and job gains in large-scale restructurings in motor vehicle and transport equipment 
manufacturing (NACE 29 and 30), 2008–2016, by country
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Box 3: Food and beverages – Small employment declines
The food and beverage sector is the one low-tech manufacturing sector in which employment declines have been 
marginal. Considerations such as the importance of proximity to market and perishable raw materials make offshoring 
much less feasible in this sector and serve as a buffer to employment.
The broad trend in sectoral employment since 2008 has been the continuation of secular patterns of ongoing shrinkage 
of manufacturing and primary sector employment, combined with employment expansion in most service sectors.
Further restructuring evidence 
from the ERM
The analysis so far is mainly based on extractions of 
EU-LFS data made in mid-July 2016.6 While the EU-LFS is 
the most reliable source of information on employment 
levels and shifts in Europe, there is no survey-based source 
of representative data on the employment impacts of 
restructuring activity at the company or establishment 
level. For this reason, Eurofound’s ERM events database is 
an important source of complementary data. It monitors 
the announced employment impacts of large-scale 
restructuring events in European countries, covering 
both job creation and destruction. Based on media 
reports across all EU28 countries as well as Norway, it is 
the single best publicly available source of EU data on 
the employment impacts of large-scale organisational 
restructuring.
The ERM dataset comprises factsheets on over 20,000 
individual restructuring events captured between 2002 
and Q2 2016. Around 100–150 new cases are added each 
month by correspondents following screening of local 
media sources. The descriptive analysis that follows gives 
a summary of restructuring developments from 2015–2016 
(up to the end of June 2016), with some data from earlier 
periods for comparison – broadly, the pre-crisis period up to 
2007 inclusive, the peak crisis years 2008–2010 and the post-
crisis period 2011–2014.
Between Q1 2015 and Q2 2016, the ERM recorded 1,974 cases 
of large-scale restructuring in the EU28 Member States as 
well as Norway and 76 cases of transnational restructuring. 
Excluding the transnational cases, there were somewhat 
more job creation cases than job loss cases (1,007 versus 
939), although total announced job loss was greater than 
total announced job gains (407,000 versus 387,000). Some 28 
restructuring cases involved announced job losses and job 
6 EU-LFS data is subject to frequent revision, so results of later extractions may not match exactly.
Figure 6: Announced restructuring job loss and job gain, by semester, 2008–2016
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Box 4: Criteria for inclusion in the ERM events database
The ERM defines job loss at restructuring in a similar way as the European Directive on Collective Redundancies (98/59/
EC) does in that it refers to intended redundancies. However, the intended redundancies do not have to be notified to 
any public authority, but rather ‘announced’, as subsequently covered in media reports. The thresholds for cases to 
be included in the dataset are that cases should involve at least 100 announced jobs gained or lost or that cases affect 
at least 10% of the workforce in establishments employing at least 250 people. The data is collected via Eurofound’s 
network of European correspondents and edited and published daily on the Eurofound website. Unlike the directive, 
however, there is no stipulation regarding the time in which the intended job loss is to occur.
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gains simultaneously. Figure 6 shows the trend in terms of 
aggregate job loss and job gain from the ERM dataset.
The main trends since the global financial crisis have been 
a decline in announced job loss and a gradual increase 
in announced job creation. The two time series have 
largely converged since 2014. At the peak of the crisis 
in 2009, announced job losses were as much as 250,000 
higher per semester than announced job gains. The most 
recent increase in job loss in the first semester of 2016 
is in significant part attributable to the bankruptcy and 
closure of major retail sector chains, as already noted. 
These cases have contributed to an increase in the share of 
bankruptcy-related restructuring in overall announced job 
loss, which rose to 24% in 2015–2016 (Table 3). The catch-all 
restructuring category of ‘internal restructuring’ continues 
to account for around two-thirds of all announced job losses 
recorded in the ERM. Other forms of restructuring account 
for marginal shares of job loss, with the share attributable 
to offshoring continuing to decline (to 2.5% in 2015–2016 
compared to over twice that in the pre-crisis period – see 
Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion).
There has, however, been a recent increase in the share of 
job losses accounted for by corporate merger and acquisition 
activity, notably in the financial sector and in relation to 
Nokia’s acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent, concluded in early 
2016.
Box 5: Financial services – Job loss following mergers
The broad financial services sector, like retail, can be characterised as stagnant or having low employment growth, 
based on EU-LFS employment estimates. Employment levels have declined marginally since 2008, but the specific 
subsector that encompasses retail and investment banking, NACE 64, has recorded significant employment decline over 
the same period (–330,000). This is in part explained by technological developments – the increasing ubiquity of self-
service and online banking services reducing the need for many traditional cashier roles. An additional factor may be 
the increased level of corporate activity in banking that has resulted, for example, in many thousands of announced job 
losses in the ERM.
Of the more recent cases in 2015–2016, most involve rationalisation within a Member State, but there are also examples 
of divestments by large multinationals (the sale of Barclays’ Spanish units to CaixaBank) as well as foreign acquisitions 
(the acquisition of Bank Gospodarki by BNP Paribas). Increased scale and the scope for cost savings via branch 
closures and job reductions appear to have been important factors in these mergers. Headcount reductions were mainly 
achieved via voluntary (incentivised) redundancies, early retirements and in some cases by means of internal transfer or 
relocation offers.
In May 2016, Italian cooperative banks Banco Popolare (BP) and Banca Popolare di Milano (BPM) announced 
2,500 redundancies, to be implemented between 2016 and 2019. This follows a merger which was approved by their 
assemblies in October 2016. The deal will create Italy’s third largest bank by assets and will result in the closure of nearly 
400 of the combined entity’s branches.
In Poland, it was announced that the headcount at Bank BGZ (Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej) would shrink by up 
to 1,800 jobs as a result of the takeover by BNP Paribas in March 2015. In the same country, 1,000 job losses were 
announced in April 2015 as a result of the merger of Alior and Meritum banks.
Spanish bank BBVA announced plans in April 2015 to dismiss 1,600 employees following the acquisition of the Spanish 
bank Catalunya Banc. The bank said it would close 20% of Catalunya Banc’s branches. The final figure of agreed job cuts 
was somewhat lower (1,557) and was reported to include over 1,000 incentivised departures, 400 offers of relocation and 
less than 100 involuntary dismissals.
The employment consequences of the 2014 CaixaBank acquisition of the Spanish branches of UK-based Barclays 
became evident in early 2015. Initially, the company called for 1,120 job losses, with some possibilities of relocation 
for 200 workers within the group. Workers relocated in other companies within the CaixaBank group would receive 
severance pay equal to 20 days per year worked, up to a maximum of 12 months. Early retirement measures were 
available for workers older than 53. For the remainder, severance pay equal to 30 days per year worked, up to 
a maximum of 22 months was offered.
Table 3: Share of announced restructuring job loss, by type of restructuring, 2002–2016
Period Bankruptcy or 
closure 
%
Internal 
restructuring 
%
Merger or 
acquisition 
%
Offshoring 
 
%
Relocation or 
outsourcing 
%
Other 
 
%
Total 
 
%
2002–2007 15.0 71.9 4.2 5.6 2.9 0.4 100
2008–2010 20.0 71.4 3.2 3.2 0.8 1.4 100
2011–2014 20.8 71.8 3.2 2.8 1.2 0.1 100
2015–2016 23.8 66.4 5.5 2.5 1.6 0.3 100
Source: ERM
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In February 2015, CaixaBank agreed with trade unions to reduce the number of dismissals from the 1,120 originally 
indicated to 975. Moreover, the company agreed to relocate 727 employees to other jobs, either internally within the 
group or externally by means of an outsourcing company. The remaining employees will be relocated externally by 
means of an outsourcing company. Employees who opted not to relocate had until the end of 2015 to join a voluntary 
redundancy scheme.
In the largest consolidation in the German banking sector for over six years, two big cooperative banks, DZ Bank and 
WGZ Bank, merged in November 2015 before announcing plans in February 2016 to cut about 700 jobs by 2019. The new 
bank, to be known as DZ, is the third biggest by assets in Germany and has 5,700 employees.
Manufacturing continues to be the sector that accounts 
for the highest share of announced job losses – and job 
gains – in the ERM restructuring events database. This is 
a consequence of the case size eligibility thresholds for 
inclusion in the database; large average establishment 
size means that manufacturers are overrepresented, 
accounting for just over half of all cases. The share of 
manufacturing in total restructuring job loss and job 
gain has, however, tended to decline over time, in line 
with the contracting share of manufacturing in aggregate 
employment. In 2015–2016, the sector accounted for 
29% of announced job gains and announced job losses 
recorded in ERM restructuring cases (Figure 7). In both 
cases, this was a decline from a 41% share in the first years 
of operation of the database (2002–2007).
Other notable recent developments in terms of the 
sectoral distribution of restructuring employment losses 
are described below.
¢ An increased share of retail sector job losses. 
These are notably due to the disappearance of 
large retail chains, as already indicated, as well as 
to technological developments, such as reduced 
employment demand due to self-service and online 
shopping. An additional vector of change highlighted 
in the ERM has been a trend of management 
delayering in a number of large retail restructurings 
in the UK in the recent period. After carrying out 
pilots of three possible management structures, UK 
supermarket chain Morrisons announced in June 
2014 that it would introduce a new management 
structure, removing at least one level of store 
management, resulting in 2,600 redundancies. In 
2015, the company cut 720 jobs from its headquarters 
in Bradford, again with the objective of simplifying 
management structures. In July 2014, Asda, one of 
the UK’s ‘big four’ retail chains, announced that it was 
cutting 1,360 jobs from its middle management tier.
¢ A sharp decline in the share of announced public 
administration job losses. This sector had accounted 
for up to 15% of total restructuring job losses in the 
post-crisis period of fiscal consolidation. This declined 
to less than 1% in 2015–2016. Of course, public sector 
restructuring announcements tend to be very large 
scale and tend to be implemented over many years, 
so restructuring job losses announced many years 
ago are in some cases still being operationalised. 
But as economies have begun to recover and policy 
emphasis on fiscal retrenchment has lessened while 
that on sustaining the recovery has increased, this 
has been reflected in a reduced prominence of public 
sector restructuring in the ERM database. This in turn 
is reflected in employment levels, which have begun 
to rise again since 2013. There were just over 280,000 
net new jobs in public administration in the EU28 in 
Q1 2016 compared to three years previously.
¢ Growth in the financial services share of announced 
job loss. This arises in part because of the corporate 
merger activity that has already been noted but also 
due to technology (notably online banking) reducing 
the need for high-street branches.
Figure 7: Share of announced job gain and job loss in large-scale restructurings, by broad sector, 2002–2016
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In terms of the sectoral distribution of announced 
job creation, the ERM restructuring data attest to the 
increasing share of services employment. The ‘other 
private services’ sector – a broad category comprising 
legal services, engineering, consultancy, media, hotels and 
restaurants, and other professional and administrative 
services – accounts for nearly one in four announced 
new jobs in recent years. The most important individual 
NACE division contributing to this growth (over 140,000 
announced new jobs since 2008) has been IT and 
information services, which is relatively the fastest-
growing sector in the EU, according to EU-LFS data (see 
Annex 2). As indicated previously, some countries and 
regions have tended to reap a disproportionate share of 
the employment gains in this sector, with Dublin in Ireland, 
Kraków and Wrocław in Poland, and Cluj-Napoca and 
Bucharest in Romania showing strong evidence of cluster 
growth in the IT sector.
Recent labour market and restructuring trends
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2 Evidence of offshoring from the ERM
Introduction
Over the past three decades, trade has become increasingly 
globalised as emerging economies have expanded their 
share of world markets and a growing number of companies 
in developed economies have organised their production 
activities on a worldwide scale. A prominent feature of the 
process has been the relocation of parts of production, 
especially the more labour-intensive parts, to countries 
with low wages to reduce the costs of manufacture. This 
tendency was already apparent in the 1990s (see, for 
example, Brainard and Riker, 1997; Mucchielli and Saucier, 
1997; Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2000; Egger and Egger, 
2003; and Navaretti and Falzoni, 2004).
The phenomenon has attracted a good deal of attention 
because of the loss of jobs involved in the developed 
countries concerned. Despite this and a number of 
high-profile examples of plants or factories being closed 
as a result of production being shifted, there is a lot of 
uncertainty about the size of the job losses attributable 
to such relocation. Data extracted from the ERM – which 
identifies the relocation of activities to other countries, 
termed ‘delocalisation’ or ‘offshoring’ – suggest that the 
jobs transferred amounted to around 10% of the total 
manufacturing jobs lost as a result of restructuring (see 
below). The overall offshoring share was lower (5%), 
reflecting the much lower incidence of services offshoring. 
Note, of course, that as with all ERM data, this refers to 
announced job loss. Nevertheless, the evidence from the 
ERM suggests that offshoring was not a major cause of the 
job losses from large company restructuring in the EU in 
the years leading up to the financial and economic crisis, 
although the numbers involved were still significant.
During a period of fairly continuous growth and high 
rates of job creation, such job losses were much less 
a cause for concern than they became after the onset of 
the crisis. More recently, reports of companies shifting 
manufacturing activities back to Europe have appeared in 
the media and have attracted some attention, though less 
so in the EU than in the US. Such moves have prompted 
suggestions that the factors underlying the initial decisions 
to relocate production to the lower-cost countries 
concerned have changed so that it is no longer profitable 
to produce abroad instead of domestically. Or the initial 
decisions themselves may have been based on mistaken 
assumptions about the scale of the cost advantages to be 
gained.
The interest in this chapter is not only on the movement 
of production out of the EU to other parts of the world 
but also on shifts within the EU itself, particularly from 
the EU15 countries to the EU13. The shifts, however, have 
not all been in one direction. There are also cases of shifts 
between EU15 countries and from EU13 countries to the 
EU15, which are of special relevance since the motivating 
factor is unlikely to be a search for lower labour costs. 
Indeed, a number of the cases reported involve a shift 
of production back to the home country of the company 
concerned, which can therefore be regarded as instances 
of onshoring or reshoring.
Box 6: Details of data used in the analysis
The offshoring analysis in this chapter uses data from the ERM restructuring events database for EU Member States 
from Q1 2003 to Q2 2016 inclusive. It excludes earlier data, as the ERM became operational at different stages of 2002 
in different Member States. Transnational restructuring cases (worldwide and in the EU) are also excluded, as many 
such cases involve double counting of employment losses – in other words, there should be relevant national cases of 
offshoring for the affected countries.
ERM data collection restricts national correspondents to selecting only one category of restructuring type for each 
case. The available options, in order of importance, are: internal restructuring (39% of all cases); business expansion 
(37%); bankruptcy or closure (together 15%); offshoring or delocalisation (4%); and merger or acquisition, relocation, 
outsourcing and other (together accounting for the remaining 5%). In reality, however, an individual restructuring 
case can involve a combination of different types of restructuring. For example, a company may close a factory as 
part of a broader group-wide restructuring in which production is offshored to South America. Such a case could be 
characterised as an internal restructuring (at company level), a closure (at establishment level) and an offshoring. To 
take account of this limitation of the data collection, keyword searches of the restructuring case narratives were carried 
out to identify cases of partial offshoring. Some cases identified as offshoring cases have been reclassified as ‘partial 
offshoring’, where it is clear from the text that not all employment losses were attributable to offshoring. A larger number 
of cases originally classified under another restructuring category have also been classified as partial offshoring, where 
the case narrative suggests that offshoring took place. Where the offshored job loss number is explicit from the text in 
these partial offshoring cases, the cited figure is used; otherwise, it is assumed that 50% of the total job losses cited are 
attributable to offshoring.
ERM annual report 2016: Globalisation slowdown? Recent evidence of offshoring and reshoring in Europe
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As regards the representativeness of the ERM estimate of the relative scale of offshoring, on the one hand, the companies 
may be reluctant to admit to shifting production to a cheaper location as the main reason for job losses. On the other 
hand, as these are often high-profile cases, the media may have a high propensity to report them. Moreover, it is 
sometimes difficult to draw a direct link between such losses and the transfer of production to other countries anyway, 
since a reduction in employment in one of a company’s sites and an expansion in another might not be presented as 
being part of the same decision.
As noted already, the ERM records cases of restructuring job loss only where those cases involve 100 or more job losses 
or the reduction of at least 10% of the workforce at a particular site employing over 250 people. This leads to a bias in 
the form of an overrepresentation of sectors with large average establishment size, such as manufacturing and, within 
manufacturing, the heavy goods sectors, such as motor vehicle production. The analysis that follows focuses mainly on 
manufacturing offshoring, as this is the sector in which ERM coverage is likely to be most comprehensive.
Moreover, the cases in question have to be reported in the media and picked up by national correspondents, neither 
of which can be assumed to always happen. Accordingly, the information recorded in the ERM gives only a partial 
indication of the number of cases of offshoring by manufacturers in the EU and of the jobs shifted as a result. It may, 
nevertheless, give an insight into the changes in the phenomenon over time, the Member States in which it has been 
most important, the industries concerned, and the countries to which production has been relocated.
Scale of manufacturing offshoring
Between January 2003 and the end of June 2016, the ERM 
captured 912 cases of offshoring, including 105 cases of 
partial offshoring.
Manufacturing is the sector in which offshoring has 
been most likely to occur, accounting for over 82% of all 
offshoring cases in the ERM dataset. This chapter will 
focus mainly on this subset of manufacturing offshoring 
cases (n=752) where, given ERM case eligibility criteria, 
the data are likely to be more representative. During the 
period covered, just over 209,000 manufacturing jobs 
were offshored – the equivalent of around 15,500 per year. 
Together, these cases accounted for 11% of job loss cases 
and around 10% of all announced restructuring job loss 
in manufacturing. The broad catch-all category of internal 
restructuring and the category of bankruptcy or closure 
account for much larger shares of job loss. These estimates 
of the relatively modest offshoring share of restructuring 
job loss are consistent with earlier findings for France and 
the US (Levine, 2012; Kirkegaard, 2007).
The ERM records a notable decrease in offshoring from the 
global financial crisis to date compared to the pre-recession 
period (Figure 8). There were 13 quarters between 2003 and 
2010 with over 5,000 offshoring job losses in each quarter, 
but only 2 subsequently. This is reflected in an offshoring 
share of overall manufacturing job loss that fell from over 
12% in 2003–2007 to 8% in 2015–2016. The decline in 
manufacturing offshoring has not coincided, according to 
ERM data, with a rise in services offshoring; if anything, the 
fall in job losses due to services offshoring has been even 
more marked than that for production jobs.
Other sources of offshoring data from developed economies 
support the idea that offshoring activity and related job 
loss have been in decline since 2008–2009. One US data 
source that enables an estimation of the jobs lost in the US 
to offshoring is the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) now 
discontinued series on extended mass lay-offs. It finds that 
Figure 8: Announced offshoring job loss in manufacturing and services, 2003–2016
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Evidence of offshoring from the ERM
less than 1% of the 100,000+ workers who were let go in 
extended mass lay-offs in Q3 2012 had their jobs moved 
to another country.7 Earlier estimates covering 2004–2005 
based on the same source were in a range of 1.4%–4% of 
mass lay-offs, depending on whether captive offshoring 
(in-house) or offshore outsourcing were included (cited 
in Kirkegaard, 2007, p. 8). Earlier US estimates of the job 
loss from offshoring during the 2001 recession arrived at 
a 3% figure for net job loss (gross job gains minus gross job 
losses, both figures cited in Levine, 2012). French evidence 
comes to similar conclusions (Fontagné and d’Isanto, 2013). 
Estimates of job losses in France attributable to offshoring 
in the period 2009–2011 were 6,600 per year, of which 3,800 
per year were in the manufacturing sector. These were 
much lower than previous estimates from the National 
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee) of 
13,500 annual job losses in the manufacturing sector alone 
in the earlier period 1995–2001 (Aubert and Sillard, 2005).8
What might be the reasons for such a decline? Two possible 
explanations are suggested. Firstly, major strategic decisions 
involving investment are more likely to be undertaken 
during periods of economic growth and more likely to be 
deferred during downturns. Offshoring involves significant 
costs in the domestic establishment (related to redundancy, 
mothballing facilities and so on) and can involve even 
greater costs in the destination country, especially if the 
offshoring requires investment in new facilities. As such, the 
declining level of offshoring since 2008 is consistent with 
normal corporate instincts in the conditions of economic 
uncertainty that have prevailed for much of the period.
The European Manufacturing Survey (cited in European 
Commission, 2012) provides supporting evidence 
of a slowdown in offshoring activity by European 
manufacturing companies between its 2005–2006 and 
2009 waves. In six out of the seven countries, the share 
of companies offshoring in four major manufacturing 
sectors (motor vehicle and transport equipment, electrical, 
chemicals and machinery) had decreased in the post-
crisis 2009 wave of data collection. The decrease was 
general across the selected sectors as well as company size 
classes. The European Commission analysis concluded 
that ‘firms focus on utilising their activities at home in 
times of (upcoming) economic crisis’.
A second potential explanation is that the peak offshoring 
period may have already passed by the time of the global 
financial crisis. Those companies wishing to offshore 
may have already largely taken advantage of production 
transfer possibilities to China or eastern Europe in the 
periods before the crisis. This second explanation would 
be more consistent with the fact that offshoring activity 
appears to still be in decline three years into a more 
sustained economic recovery. In this reading, the main 
offshoring period (from the early 1990s to 2007) coincides 
with the one-off opportunity for western producers to take 
advantage of lower wage costs in what Richard Freeman 
referred to as the ‘great doubling’ – the opening and 
marketisation of the previously largely closed Chinese and 
former Eastern Bloc economies in the 1990s (Freeman, 
2007). The ERM data offer some support for this hypothesis, 
but it can only be partial, as the ERM data series begins in 
2002–2003, well after the beginning of this epochal shift.
There may well be other external circumstances 
contributing to a declining interest in offshoring by EU-
based companies, such as eroding labour cost differentials 
between host and destination countries; the declining 
labour intensity of production; increased awareness of the 
costs of offshoring in terms of management complexity; 
quality control issues; and exposure to transport costs 
and delays. There are also benefits to not offshoring, such 
as synergies between R&D, product development and 
manufacture in a context of rapid product cycle changes.
Geographical distribution 
of offshoring
Most of the cases of offshoring identified in the ERM 
events database, as expected, occurred in EU15 countries, 
though the number in EU139 Member States increased 
sharply during the global financial crisis before falling 
off somewhat subsequently. Over the years 2008–2016, 
around 20% of cases involved movements of production 
from the EU13 to other countries. Indeed, the number of 
cases reported in the Czech Republic was larger than in 
Belgium, the Netherlands or Spain over the same period.
The pattern of change in the number of cases varies across 
countries within the EU15 (Table 4). In the years 2003–
2007, there was a relative concentration of cases in France, 
Germany and the UK (which together accounted for 39% 
of the total number reported). During the peak years of 
the global financial crisis and its aftermath (2008–2009), 
the number of cases reported in the UK remained high but 
declined sharply in France and Germany, while there was 
a marked increase in the number of cases in the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ireland and Sweden.
In 2010-14, the share of cases reported in the UK declined, 
as it did to an even greater extent in Ireland, but it remained 
relatively high in Sweden Member States, while in Germany, 
there was a surge of cases in 2010–2014, especially in the 
most recent period, 2015–2016. In Italy, too, the share of 
7 The BLS mass lay-off statistics had advantages over the ERM as a tool of estimation. It is based on comprehensive administrative data of completed events rather 
than newspaper reports of restructurings. It also has similar limitations in terms of scope of coverage. It excludes smaller companies and focuses on larger lay-offs. 
The criterion for inclusion is that a company must have at least 50 employees and have let go at least 50 employees in lay-offs lasting at least one month. Though 
these case eligibility criteria differ from those of the ERM, the shared focus on the employment effects of larger-scale restructurings suggests that the BLS data may 
serve at least as a useful benchmark for the ERM’s estimations of the share of large-scale restructuring job loss accounted for by offshoring. For example, they will 
share a similar bias towards inclusion of manufacturing companies, where employment numbers are generally high. 
8 The Insee analysis is based on identifying offshoring (delocalisation) cases using a combination of sector- and enterprise-level employment and trade data. 
Offshoring enterprises are those where there has been a reduction in employment levels of at least 25% and where there has been an increase in imports of goods 
or components formerly produced in France.
9 This chapter refers to the EU13 throughout, but ERM coverage of the 2004 and 2007 accession states commenced only in 2004–2005, and coverage of the newest 
Member State, Croatia, began only in 2013.
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cases, which had been relatively small in the first six years of 
the period, increased markedly from 2010 on before falling 
back again in 2015–2016.
There was, therefore, a change between the first and second 
halves of the period in the countries in which offshoring cases 
were concentrated. The countries with the highest share 
of offshoring cases reported in the ERM have been France, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK over both periods, but the 
share of the UK (as well as Ireland) has declined over time, 
while that of Germany in particular has increased.
Although there were more job losses from offshoring in the 
EU15 than in the EU13, the difference is much smaller than 
for the number of cases. Over the period 2003–2016, some 
16% of job losses were in EU13 countries, but during the 
global financial crisis, the EU13 share was as high as 30% 
before falling off somewhat in subsequent years. This was 
attributable to surges in the offshoring share of job loss in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in particular. Given that 
the principal destination of offshore production in these 
cases was either Romania or China, one can infer that the 
motivation was primarily cost reduction. This was explicitly 
stated in cases such as Avent Slovakia and AEES. Avent 
Slovakia closed its medical clothing plant at Piešťany in May 
2008, with 853 job losses, transferring production to China. 
The American private equity company Platinum Equity took 
over AEES, a producer of wiring harness systems for the 
car industry, from Alcoa in 2009 and proceeded to close 
the Stříbro (Czech Republic) site, with the loss of 733 jobs. 
The production was moved to Romania for cost reasons, 
according to the new owners.
The average number of jobs lost per offshoring case in the 
EU13 was larger than in the EU15. Perhaps unexpectedly, 
in terms of jobs losses, offshoring after 2010 has become 
a relatively more important cause of manufacturing 
employment job losses in the EU13 compared to the EU15 
(see Table 5).
As in respect of case numbers, there was a shift in the relative 
concentration of offshoring in terms of job losses between the 
three biggest offshoring Member States – Germany, France 
and the UK – with the UK share tending to decline. These 
three countries account for nearly 40% of total offshoring job 
losses in manufacturing over the period covered.
Table 4: Share of cases of offshoring in manufacturing per EU Member State, as a percentage of the total, 2003–2016
2003–2007 
%
2008–2009 
%
2010–2014 
%
2015–2016 
%
2003–2016 
%
UK 15.0 16.0 6.3 10.6 12.5
France 14.5 5.0 9.6 14.9 11.7
Sweden 8.7 8.4 16.4 6.4 10.6
Germany 9.0 5.9 11.5 23.4 10.1
Italy 5.5 4.2 9.1 2.1 6.1
Ireland 7.4 9.2 2.4 2.1 6.0
Denmark 5.5 8.4 4.3 6.4 5.7
Finland 6.1 1.7 5.3 6.4 5.2
Belgium 4.2 4.2 5.3 4.3 4.5
Netherlands 5.0 1.7 4.8 4.3 4.4
Austria 2.6 5.0 4.8 2.1 3.6
Spain 4.5 5.0 1.4 2.1 3.6
Portugal 5.3 0.8 1.4 2.1 3.3
Czech Republic 0.5 7.6 4.8 2.1 2.9
Hungary 2.1 0.8 3.4 0.0 2.1
Slovakia 0.5 5.9 1.4 4.3 1.9
Slovenia 1.3 1.7 1.9 0.0 1.5
Poland 0.8 2.5 1.4 0.0 1.2
Latvia 0.3 2.5 1.0 0.0 0.8
Estonia 0.0 0.8 1.4 2.1 0.7
Bulgaria 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.4
Malta 0.3 0.0 0.5 2.1 0.4
Romania 0.0 1.7 0.5 0.0 0.4
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.1 0.3
Luxembourg 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
EU15 93.7 76.5 82.7 87.2 87.5
EU13 6.3 23.5 17.3 12.8 12.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Average number of cases per year
EU28 76 60 42 31 56
Notes:  The cases relate to those announced between 2003 and end of June 2016. The figures for the first six months of 2016 have been converted to an 
annual basis (in other words, multiplied by 2) so as to be comparable with those for the earlier periods.
Source: ERM
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Evidence of offshoring from the ERM
From 2003 to the end of June 2016, offshoring accounted 
for around 10% of the total jobs lost from the restructuring 
of manufacturing companies recorded in the ERM. It was 
higher in the EU15 (11%) than in the EU13 (7%) (see Table 6). 
As indicated previously, its relative importance declined over 
the period, or more specifically, between 2003–2007, when it 
was responsible for over 12% of all job losses reported to the 
ERM, and 2015–2016, when it accounted for 8%. This overall 
decline conceals very different trends in the EU15 and the 
EU13. The share of manufacturing job loss attributable to 
offshoring has halved in the EU15 (from 14% to 7%), while 
it has increased by a factor of four in the EU13 (from 4% to 
15%; see Table 6). This is a reflection in part of the dynamic 
nature of offshoring strategies. In many cases, firms that 
initially offshored from higher-cost western European 
locations to eastern Europe have subsequently offshored 
further afield to even lower-cost, non-EU destinations. An 
illustrative case in point is that of Finnish multinational 
Nokia. Having established a major mobile phone production 
facility in Bochum, Germany, in the late 1990s, the company 
subsequently offshored this production to Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania, in 2008 before in turn closing this facility in 2011 as 
production was once again offshored, this time to lower-cost 
regions outside the EU, notably China.
Within the EU15, offshoring has been especially important 
as a source of job losses in smaller, less populous Member 
States such as Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal. 
In each of those countries, it accounted for over 20% of 
manufacturing job losses in 2003–2016. In the larger Member 
States, the offshoring share of restructuring job loss lies in 
a narrow range between 7% in Germany and 10.5% in Italy; 
in each of these countries, the share declined in 2003–2007 
and more recent periods. In the EU13 countries, there has 
been a notable rise in the share of offshoring job loss since 
2010, notably in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that offshoring has 
become more important in the EU13 over the past few years.
Table 5: Share of jobs lost from offshoring in manufacturing per Member State, as a percentage of the total, 2003–2016
2003–2007 
%
2008–2009 
%
2010–2014 
%
2015–2016 
%
2003–2016 
%
UK 16.0 13.6 9.2 11.7 13.7
Germany 15.0 11.4 10.2 17.6 13.3
France 14.0 5.8 9.7 13.2 11.4
Ireland 7.2 10.8 1.5 1.5 6.2
Sweden 4.3 3.1 11.6 8.1 6.1
Italy 4.3 3.4 8.2 1.6 5.0
Belgium 4.9 2.3 7.1 3.4 4.9
Portugal 8.7 0.5 0.5 1.9 4.8
Denmark 4.3 6.3 3.5 5.3 4.5
Finland 4.8 1.6 3.6 3.9 3.9
Spain 4.9 3.6 0.9 2.8 3.5
Netherlands 4.2 0.7 3.2 6.9 3.4
Austria 1.7 7.0 4.3 1.3 3.3
Czech Republic 0.2 8.4 5.3 2.2 3.1
Hungary 1.5 1.7 7.4 0.0 3.0
Slovakia 0.9 9.6 1.6 7.3 2.9
Poland 0.7 4.2 4.1 0.0 2.2
Slovenia 1.5 1.3 2.2 0.0 1.6
Romania 0.0 1.6 4.1 0.0 1.4
Estonia 0.0 0.6 0.9 6.6 0.6
Latvia 0.1 2.4 0.3 0.0 0.6
Malta 0.5 0.0 0.2 1.6 0.4
Bulgaria 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.2
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.2 0.2
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
EU15 94.4 70.2 73.4 79.2 83.9
EU13 5.6 29.8 26.7 20.8 16.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Average number of jobs lost per year
EU28 21,675 19,013 10,710 6,212 15,502
Note:  The number of jobs lost relate to the minimum losses reported in the cases announced between 2003 and end-June 2016. The figures for the first 
six months of 2016 have been converted to an annual basis (in other words, multiplied by 2) so as to be comparable with those for the earlier 
period.
Source: ERM
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Table 6:  Share of job losses from offshoring relative to total job losses reported from restructuring in manufacturing, 
by Member State, 2003–2016
2003–2007 
%
2008–2009 
%
2010–2014 
%
2015–2016 
%
2003–2016 
%
Ireland 38.2 33.1 15.8 11.5 32.9
Portugal 38.7 2.5 3.7 31.2 26.0
Malta 34.5 0.0 100.0 50.0 22.9
Austria 20.7 26.8 24.6 5.7 22.9
Denmark 26.0 15.8 19.8 29.1 21.3
Slovakia 9.7 22.3 9.1 38.3 16.5
Latvia 7.0 28.3 6.6 0.0 16.1
Netherlands 19.2 2.8 13.5 17.5 14.5
Belgium 18.5 4.7 13.1 8.2 12.8
Estonia 0.0 8.7 20.0 56.0 12.8
Finland 18.4 5.6 8.1 6.9 11.9
Sweden 11.9 3.2 18.2 10.9 10.9
Italy 17.6 4.5 10.7 3.4 10.5
UK 12.3 8.2 9.0 6.2 10.3
Hungary 10.6 2.4 17.1 0.0 9.5
Luxembourg 11.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 9.2
Spain 14.0 9.1 1.9 6.9 9.1
France 12.3 3.8 6.4 10.2 8.7
Slovenia 17.4 3.1 8.8 0.0 8.3
Czech Republic 1.1 7.5 15.5 19.6 7.7
Germany 8.7 6.5 5.2 4.4 7.0
Bulgaria 20.4 0.0 5.4 0.0 4.8
Romania 0.0 2.6 11.8 0.0 3.5
Poland 1.5 2.8 6.4 0.0 3.2
Lithuania 0.0 0.0 21.9 100.0 2.3
Croatia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyprus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EU15 14.4 7.5 9.0 7.3 10.9
EU13 3.8 5.7 11.1 14.6 6.7
EU28 12.4 6.8 9.4 8.2 9.9
Notes:  Restructuring at the global level (included under the category ‘World’ in the ERM events database), where sites are in a number of countries, 
both inside and outside the EU, is excluded because offshoring is rarely undertaken on this scale, and in any case it is difficult to distinguish the 
job losses in the EU from those elsewhere. Percentages are based on small counts (less than five manufacturing offshorings) in the following 
countries and are therefore less reliable: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Romania.
Source:  ERM
Industries most involved in 
offshoring
Offshoring has not been evenly distributed across 
industries within manufacturing. Instead, it has tended to 
be concentrated in a few of them and in the engineering 
industries in particular. Three subsectors – motor vehicles, 
electronics and electrical equipment – account for nearly 
60% of all offshoring jobs lost. Of these, motor vehicle 
production (NACE 29) accounted for almost a quarter (just 
over 22%) of all job losses as a result of offshoring over the 
period 2003 to end of June 2016 and a somewhat greater 
share in the EU13 (25%) (Table 7).
In the EU15, the relative share of offshoring job losses in 
the motor vehicle sector has been stable or increasing 
over time, even as it has declined in other manufacturing 
sectors. In the EU13, it has accounted for an increased 
share of job loss since 2008. Not all of these cases have 
been motivated purely by cost considerations. One of the 
largest offshorings in the sector was the decision of Fiat 
Poland to return production of its classic Panda model to 
Italy in December 2012. This resulted in the reduction of 
1,450 jobs in the 5,000-strong workforce at Tychy.
The electrical equipment industry (NACE 27), which 
includes a diverse range of products, from domestic 
appliances to switchgear for electricity-generating 
stations to light bulbs, was the second largest source of 
job losses from offshoring over the period, accounting for 
around 18% of the total. While there was little variation 
in its relative importance over the 10 years in the EU15, 
there was significant fluctuation in the EU13, where it 
has become the subsector with the most offshoring job 
losses and in which EU13 offshoring job losses exceed 
those of the EU15 since 2010. In some cases, it is clear 
that this relates to the production of domestic appliances 
that had previously been offshored to EU13 countries 
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before being offshored again elsewhere. For example, the 
local Slovakian subsidiary of Japanese Sumitomo, SEWS 
Slovakia, announced the dismissal of 398 workers at its 
Topolcany plant in July 2015 as production was offshored 
to Romania. Management attributed the decision to price 
competition and the difficulties of keeping production 
costs under control. Similarly, in October 2014, PKC, 
a Finnish producer of wiring systems, announced the 
closure of its factory in Sosnowiec, Poland, and the 
relocation of production to Serbia.
The electronics industry (NACE 26), which includes 
products such as televisions and mobile phones as well as 
computer equipment, is the third most important source 
of job losses from offshoring. In this subsector, the bulk 
of the job losses occurred in the period up to 2009 and 
occurred mainly in EU15 Member States.
These three industries were responsible for almost 60% 
of the overall number of jobs lost from offshoring in 
manufacturing in the EU between 2003 and 2016. Another 
engineering subsector, machinery and equipment, has 
become a more important source of offshoring job losses 
in the more recent post-crisis period. Other manufacturing 
subsectors that have made a significant contribution 
to overall offshoring job losses include the textiles and 
clothing sectors and the chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
sectors. In both, the main offshoring activity occurred 
in the period up to or during the global financial crisis. 
Subsequent offshoring has been limited.
It is interesting that offshoring activity appears to have 
been more intense in industry sectors where employment 
levels have proven more resilient, such as motor vehicles 
(+4% since 2008; see Table 2b), and to have fallen off 
sharply in textiles and clothing in recent years despite 
overall employment levels in these sectors recording steep 
declines (–31% since 2008 in the EU28).
Two points can be made. The first is that there is no positive 
relationship between offshoring intensity and employment 
levels at the industry level. If anything, offshoring and the 
Table 7: Job losses from cases of offshoring, by sector within manufacturing, 2003–2016
Sector 2003–2007 2008–2009 2010–2014 2015–2016 2003–2016
Motor vehicles (NACE 29)
EU15 22,903 4,801 9,351 1,175 38,230
EU13 600 3,903 3,807 8,310
EU28 23,503 8,704 13,158 1,175 46,540
Electrical equipment (NACE 27)
EU15 17,346 4,418 4,623 1,102 27,489
EU13 1,836 1,537 5,207 1,011 9,591
EU28 19,182 5,955 9,830 2,113 37,080
Electronics (NACE 26)
EU15 17,447 8,263 5,050 1,032 31,792
EU13 400 3,457 3,857
EU28 17,447 8,663 8,507 1,032 35,649
Textiles and clothing (NACE 13 and 14)
EU15 5,014 889 597 246 6,746
EU13 2,037 2,142 300 300 4,779
EU28 7,051 3,031 897 546 11,525
Machinery and equipment (NACE 28)
EU15 3,959 1,137 5,534 977 11,607
EU13 733 984 200 1,917
EU28 3,959 1,870 6,518 1,177 13,524
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals (NACE 20 and 21)
EU15 6,194 1,975 1,067 293 9,529
EU13 124 278 402
EU28 6,318 1,975 1,067 571 9,931
Food and beverages (NACE 10 and 11)
EU15 5,084 396 2,041 775 8,295
EU13 595 1,074 319 1,988
EU28 5,679 1,470 2,360 775 10,283
Total of above NACE sectors
EU15 77,947 21,879 28,262 5,600 133,687
EU13 5,192 9,789 14,074 1,789 30,844
EU28 83,139 31,668 42,336 7,389 164,531
Other 14 NACE manufacturing sectors
EU15 24,335 4,825 11,019 1,779 41,958
EU13 904 1,533 197 150 2,784
EU28 25,239 6,358 11,216 1,929 44,742
Source: ERM
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geographical diversification of production appear to have 
been an important support to aggregate EU employment in 
a sector such as motor vehicle production where, as already 
noted, there has clearly been a sizeable intra-EU movement 
of production and employment.
Secondly, the dramatic declines in employment in sectors 
such as textiles and clothing since 2008 appear largely 
unrelated to offshoring. They arise principally out of the 
related but quite distinct phenomenon of international trade 
competition, where low-cost producers in non-EU countries 
take over markets formerly serviced by EU-based companies. 
More generally, offshoring accounts for only a relatively 
marginal share of trade-induced job losses in developed 
economies. In other words, the shift of certain industries such 
as textile production or shipbuilding out of Europe occurs 
mainly as a consequence of independent developments of 
company expansion and contraction in different countries 
over time, resulting from shifts in competitive advantage, and 
is only partially a result of offshoring per se.
Destination of offshored 
manufacturing production
Most of the cases of offshoring in manufacturing recorded 
in the ERM involve a shift of production to low-wage 
countries, though by no means all. Considering the 
EU15 countries first, over the period between 2003 and 
end of June 2016, just over 10% of the jobs lost from 
offshoring in manufacturing involved a shift of production 
to China, another 3% to India and around 9% to other 
Asian countries (Table 8). Asia as a whole, therefore, 
was the destination for cases of offshoring involving less 
than a quarter of the total jobs lost from this form of 
restructuring.10 The share of job losses from offshoring to 
Asia remained quite steady over the period covered.
Offshoring manufacturing to other countries outside the 
EU with low labour costs was on a much smaller scale. 
Relocation of production to the Americas accounted for 
less than 5% of the total jobs. The main low-labour-cost 
destination for manufacturers in the EU15 to relocate 
production to over this period was the EU13, which 
accounted for 45% of the jobs lost from offshoring. This 
proportion reached a peak around the onset of the 
crisis in 2008 and 2009 and became less important as 
a destination after 2010, but it still accounts for over a third 
of all offshoring job losses from EU15 Member States. As 
the EU13 share has decreased, that of other European but 
non-EU countries has increased, particularly Russia, the 
Balkan countries and Turkey.
Just under a fifth of the jobs lost from offshoring by EU15 
manufacturers, however, were a result of relocating 
production to other EU15 countries, where in most cases 
access to low labour costs was not the main motivating 
factor, though rationalisation of production was in 
a number of cases. Moreover, the relative importance 
of other parts of the EU15 as a destination increased in 
particular from 2010 onwards, reaching 23% of the total 
losses from offshoring, much the same as the losses from 
moving production to Asia. This suggests, therefore, 
that labour costs might have become a less important 
determinant of the location of manufacturing in the 
past few years, though the job losses from offshoring 
production to countries with low – or at least lower – 
labour costs still made up over 70% of the total lost from 
the cases of offshoring reported by the ERM.
As indicated above, a significant proportion (20%–30%) 
of the jobs lost from offshoring in the EU has been in EU13 
countries over the past 10 years. The production offshored, 
as in the EU15, has tended to go to low-labour-cost 
countries, in this case with even lower labour costs than 
in the EU13. China and Asia, at 26% and 36%, respectively, 
account for a much higher share of offshored jobs than 
the EU15 over the entire period (Table 9). Offshoring to 
other low-labour-cost countries outside the EU and to the 
Americas accounted for a further 19% of offshoring jobs lost.
Table 8: Share of jobs lost from offshoring in manufacturing in the EU15, by destination of the relocated production, 
2005–2014
2003–2007 
%
2008–2009 
%
2010–2016 
%
2003–2016 
%
EU15 17.4 13.4 22.9 18.2
EU13 46.7 53.9 35.2 44.8
Other or non-specified Europe 5.7 2.9 12.4 7.0
Other or non-specified Asia 9.7 4.5 10.8 9.1
China 10.2 12.5 8.7 10.2
India 1.6 5.0 2.9 2.5
Americas 5.4 4.3 4.0 4.9
Rest of world 3.3 3.5 3.2 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  Figures relate to destinations that are specified in the cases of offshoring included in the ERM, which is most of them in practice. Where more 
than one destination is mentioned, figures for jobs lost are divided proportionately between them.
Source: ERM events database
10 The ERM includes a category for the countries that production is offshored to. One of the options, ‘various destinations’, accounts for just over 20% of cases. In 
nearly all of these cases, however, it is possible to detect the destination countries in the additional ‘free’ information reported. The analysis here makes use of this 
additional information to give a more complete account of the countries concerned. In the end, the analysis excludes only 33 of the 752 manufacturing offshoring 
cases where it was not possible to specify the destination country.
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Again, however, a substantial proportion of job losses from 
offshoring from the EU13 – almost a third over the period 
as a whole – was a result of production being relocated to 
other EU13 countries. This leaves just over 15% of the jobs 
being lost a result of production shifts to higher-labour-
cost countries in the EU15 as well as to the US and Canada. 
This proportion has declined somewhat since the crisis. 
Some of the relocation concerned involves reshoring, in 
the sense of companies moving production back to the 
home country, though a more systematic treatment of this 
phenomenon will be provided by the European Reshoring 
Monitor.
Where it is possible to identify cases of reshoring in the 
ERM, they suggest that the decision to relocate production 
away from the EU13 was part of an overall plan to 
reorganise the location of production. In some cases, this 
was motivated by increases in costs in the EU13, including 
transport costs, while in others it was motivated by 
a downturn in the market and the need to rationalise. They 
also suggest that reshoring is not confined to more recent 
years. For example, there is a case reported of a German 
company, Format Tresorbau, a manufacturer of safes, 
moving production from Poland back to Germany in 2005 
because of rising transport costs and increasing wages 
in Poland as well as the lower quality of output than in 
Germany. However, while 110 jobs were lost in Poland as 
a result of the decision, the company planned to take on 
only 36 new workers in Germany.
Nevertheless, as in the EU15, most of the job losses from 
offshoring in the EU13, even in the most recent years, are 
a consequence of production being shifted to low-wage 
countries, if more to countries in Asia than to other parts of 
the EU13. The reason given by the companies concerned 
for such moves is predominantly to take advantage of 
the even lower labour costs in the countries in question. 
In the case of relocation to other EU13 countries, many 
of the jobs that were moved went from higher-wage 
countries (such as the Czech Republic in particular, but 
also Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) to lower-wage ones, 
with Romania being the major destination. Consequently, 
Romania was effectively an alternative location to 
countries such as Serbia or Bosnia, Tunisia and other 
parts of North Africa or China and other parts of Asia, with 
the advantage of being closer and within the EU. There is 
also, of course, the wider advantage to the EU economy 
of keeping production inside the EU, although how long it 
is likely to prove possible to do so is open to question as 
incomes and wages rise.
Box 7: Brexit – Potential employment impacts
As of August 2016, no ERM restructuring case had explicitly related an announced job loss or job gain to the UK 
referendum decision to exit the EU (the so-called ‘Brexit’ of 23 June 2016). However, a number of announcements refer 
to Brexit as potentially affecting recruitment or redundancy decisions.
In the biggest case, in July 2016, Lloyds Banking Group announced plans to cut a further 3,000 jobs from its 
workforce and to close a further 200 branches in the UK. While the bank did not directly link the decision to Brexit, its 
chief executive commented that ‘following the EU referendum the outlook for the UK economy is uncertain and … 
a deceleration of growth seems likely’. The explicit reason given for the job losses was the decline in branch transactions 
by 15% year on year as customers increasingly conduct banking transactions online. Lloyds, in which the UK government 
retains a 9% shareholding, has shed around 45,000 jobs in the UK since the global financial crisis. The latest round of 
cuts is to be implemented by the end of 2017.
Holiday provider Lowcost Travel Group entered administration in July 2016, causing the loss of all 451 jobs in Poland 
and Crawley (UK) as well as Switzerland and Majorca. The company cited Brexit and the strength of the euro against UK 
sterling as factors contributing to the collapse.
Table 9: Share of jobs lost from offshoring in manufacturing in the EU13, by destination of the relocated production, 
2005–2014
2003–2007 
%
2008–2009 
%
2010–2016 
%
2003–2016 
%
EU15 17.8 11.6 11.5 12.7
EU13 29.4 33.3 31.8 31.9
Other or non-specified Europe 14.7 7.3 10.3 10.1
Other or non-specified Asia 10.5 0.0 10.1 6.9
China 13.9 31.2 27.4 26.2
India 0.0 0.0 6.8 3.3
Americas 3.7 3.1 1.1 2.2
Rest of world 9.9 13.4 1.0 6.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note:  Figures relate to destinations that are specified in the cases of offshoring included in the ERM, which are most cases in practice. Where more than 
one destination is mentioned, figures for jobs lost are divided proportionately between them.
Source: ERM events database
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German multinational Siemens was reported to have softened its stance on the implications of Brexit for its future level 
of activity in the UK. Prior to the referendum, it had made a public statement encouraging a vote to remain in the EU on 
the basis ‘that being part of the EU is good for UK jobs and prosperity, and we have concerns about the possible effects 
of a vote to leave’. It was also reported to be putting investment in the UK on hold pending the referendum outcome. 
Following the referendum, it announced plans to recruit an additional 100 workers at its plant in Hull in the UK. This will 
bring the workforce at the site to over 500. The manufacturing unit produces blades for wind turbines. Siemens also has 
a significant involvement in some of the UK’s biggest ongoing or planned engineering projects: Thameslink, Crossrail 
and the HS2 high-speed rail project.
In August 2016, I.T. Alliance Group confirmed that it has seen a sharp increase in applications for skilled IT positions 
from non-British EU nationals following Britain’s vote to leave the EU. A spokesman for the company, which announced 
plans to recruit 120 people to its UK and Irish operations, said that ‘Brexit appears to have caused uncertainty and 
unease amongst a number of EU nationals working in the UK, even though these are highly skilled people who one 
would have expected that the UK would be keen to retain after Brexit. A significant number of candidates specifically 
referred to concerns around Brexit as a motivation to relocate to Ireland.’
Of course, the UK remains in the single market and will exit the EU formally only in late 2018 at the earliest. The 
effects of Brexit may only become evident in the next decade. The most immediate economic consequence of Brexit 
has been a 10% weakening of UK sterling against other major currencies, which has been a boost to UK exporters 
and manufacturers as well as the tourist industry. Those who advocated Brexit have taken comfort from relatively 
upbeat economic indicators in the UK after the referendum. Time will tell to what extent ‘Project Optimism’ has solid 
foundations.
Conclusion
The cases reported in the ERM demonstrate very clearly 
that there is a continuous search for lower costs of 
production in many industries, with companies shifting the 
location of production as necessary in order to minimise 
costs, even if it means moving from sites that were 
established relatively recently.
Nonetheless, offshoring accounts for a relatively 
minor share of overall job loss arising from large-scale 
restructurings in the manufacturing sector. Around 1 
in 10 job losses results from activities being offshored, 
and the manufacturing sector still accounts for the vast 
majority of cases (over 82%) of offshoring from the EU. 
Despite predictions regarding the rise of service sector 
offshoring, in only one Member State – the UK – is the 
share of offshoring job losses greater in services than in 
manufacturing.
Three manufacturing subsectors account for around 60% 
of offshoring job losses: production of motor vehicles, 
electronics (computers and mobile phones) and electrical 
products (domestic appliances). While the large Member 
States dominate in terms of absolute offshoring job 
losses (France, Germany and the UK but also Sweden), 
the share of offshoring activity is relatively much higher 
in some smaller, EU15 Member States (Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland and Portugal), where it accounts for over 20% of 
restructuring job losses (compared to less than 10% in the 
large Member States).
Most offshoring in the EU is ‘nearshoring’ – the 
predominant destination of offshored activity has been 
the EU13 Member States. Europe as a whole, including 
non-EU countries, accounts for over half of offshored jobs, 
both from the old and the newer Member States. China 
accounts for around 10% of offshored job loss from the 
EU15 and a much higher 26% from the EU13. But the share 
of Asia, including China, as the destination responsible for 
offshoring job losses is comparable to that of the EU15, 
where presumably the motivation for the international 
transfer of production is unlikely to be costs.
The share of manufacturing job loss attributable to 
offshoring has halved in the EU15 (from 14% to 7% 
between 2003–2007 and 2015–2016), while it has increased 
by a factor of four in the EU13 in the same period.
Perhaps the most striking finding of this analysis is 
that there appears to have been a decline in offshoring 
activity from the EU manufacturing sector dating back 
to the onset of the global financial crisis. The average 
annual number of offshoring cases reported to the ERM 
has more than halved between the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods, and the level of resulting job losses has 
declined even more sharply. There are many potential 
factors behind this decline, but one explanation is that 
the ‘offshoring calculation’ – in terms of cost differentials, 
available offshoring destinations and so on – was uniquely 
favourable, especially for western European businesses, 
in the period 1990–2007 and that the easy gains from 
offshoring were largely reaped by European businesses in 
that pre-crisis period.
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3 Recent evidence of reshoring
Introduction
In recent years, there has been some indication of 
companies shifting manufacturing activities back to 
relatively high-wage economies, though less so in the EU 
than in the US. Such moves have prompted suggestions 
that the factors underlying the initial decisions to relocate 
production to the lower-cost countries concerned have 
changed so that it is no longer as profitable to produce 
abroad instead of domestically, or that the initial decisions 
themselves were based on misplaced assumptions about 
the scale of the cost advantages to be gained.
Prominent among the US cases have been large companies, 
including Apple (which contracted a Flextronics plant 
in Texas to assemble its new Mac Pro computer using 
domestically sourced parts) and General Electric (which 
moved manufacturing of washing machines, fridges and 
heaters back from China to a factory in Kentucky in 2012) as 
well as cases from Caterpillar, Ford, General Motors, NCR, 
Electrolux and Whirlpool. A survey conducted in 2013 by the 
Boston Consultancy Group found that over half of the US-
based executives in manufacturing companies with sales 
of over USD 1 billion planned to reshore production to the 
US from China or were actively considering it. In addition, 
many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have also 
done so over the past two to three years. The substantial 
reduction in energy prices that the development of shale 
gas in the US has brought about seems to be a significant 
factor underlying the moves concerned.
Given the evidence available, however, and its limited 
nature, in particular, it is difficult to be sure what the 
scale of reshoring has been. At the beginning of 2013, the 
number of companies known to have brought production 
back to the US was put at well under 100, though many 
more might have done so quietly without wanting to 
attract publicity. In addition, most of the multinationals 
concerned have brought back only part of their production 
from abroad, and many of the biggest companies have still 
offshored much more of their production than they have 
reshored in the recent past (The Economist, 2013).
It is even more difficult to assess the scale of reshoring in 
Europe (see Kinkel and Maloca, 2009) or to identify the 
kinds of companies involved. Much of the evidence consists 
of cases of companies that have chosen to publicise their 
decision to bring production back to their home country. 
It is difficult to know how representative these are. 
Companies can be reluctant to release such information if 
it implies that they were mistaken in their initial decision to 
offshore activities in the first place, and larger companies 
may be hesitant to reveal too many details of their global 
strategy (Holz, 2009; Heise et al, 2005).
At the same time, the emergence of the issue as a policy 
concern of governments, with both the French and UK 
governments following the US example of introducing 
specific initiatives to support companies bringing 
production back,11 means that there is an official incentive 
to publicise cases. The fact that it is possible to find more 
French or UK examples of reshoring than German ones 
is almost certainly due in large measure to the issue 
attracting more publicity in France and the UK, partly 
because of it being pushed strongly by the government in 
both countries. It does not necessarily mean, therefore, 
that the number of companies taking such action is 
actually higher in France and the UK than in Germany.
The analysis in this chapter takes the form of a review 
of recent evidence of reshoring. It focuses specifically 
on German and UK manufacturing companies moving 
production back from locations abroad to the domestic 
economy. The aim is to obtain an indication not only of the 
types of company involved, their typical size and the kinds 
of product they manufacture, but also the reasons for the 
decision to shift production, or parts of the production 
process, back to the countries in question.
Scale of reshoring to Germany and 
the UK
Germany
While there are no systematic and structured data available 
on reshoring activities in the EU as a whole, there are some 
data for Germany. As part of the European Manufacturing 
Survey (EMS)12 conducted by the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Systems and Innovation Research (Fraunhofer ISI) 
on the diffusion of advanced production technologies in 
manufacturing, German companies have been asked about 
their offshoring and reshoring (in German, Rückverlagerung) 
of production and R&D every other year since 1995. The 
last survey is for the period mid-2010 to mid-2012 and 
covers a sample of 1,594 companies. The main features 
of developments over this period, indicated by the data 
collected by the survey, are summarised in Figure 9.
On average, 13% of German manufacturing companies have 
production facilities abroad, although, as expected, there 
is big difference between large and small companies. While 
just 3% of small companies (with fewer than 50 people 
employed) were engaged in activities offshore in 2010–2012 
and only 16% of medium-sized ones (with 50–249 people 
employed), 40% of companies employing between 250 
and 999 people and 83% of those employing 1,000 or more 
people did so. For large companies, therefore, offshoring 
tends to be the rule rather than the exception.
11 The French Ministry for Industrial Renewal has even developed a specific instrument, the Colbert 2.0, which was inspired by the US Reshoring Initiative and which 
has been available since July 2013 on a website, www.colbert2-0.fr, to help companies to examine the advantages of bringing some of their operations back to 
France. In the UK, the government has implemented the Reshore UK initiative to support companies that want to bring production back home.
12 The survey is also carried out in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK, but the results do not seem to be published.
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The companies with facilities abroad produced on average 
39% of their output abroad (Figure 10). Interestingly, the 
figure for small companies, 54%, is higher than average 
and higher too than for large companies, suggesting that 
those small companies that do manufacture in other 
countries tend to concentrate much of their production 
there. For medium-sized companies, by contrast, the 
proportion was only around a third.
Figure 10: Share of output produced abroad by German 
manufacturing companies with production facilities in 
other countries, by company size, 2010–2012
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The largest share of production capacity of German 
manufacturers located abroad was in the EU (over half, 
or 21% of total capacity), mainly in the EU12 (Figure 11), 
and much of this was owned by small companies. Asia 
is the second most important location, accounting for 
just over 20% of production capacity abroad (around 8% 
of the total), much of it owned by large companies with 
over 1,000 people employed. North and Central America 
accounted for around 15% of capacity abroad and eastern 
European countries outside the EU for around 5%. These 
proportions in the geographical breakdown of offshoring 
have remained much the same over time, with relatively 
little variation.
Figure 11: Distribution of production capacity of 
German companies as a percentage of total capacity, 
2010–2012
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Over the period 2010–2012, some 8% of German 
manufacturers moved part of their production abroad 
(Figure 12), the smallest proportion since the first survey 
was carried out in the mid-1990s. The reduction in 
offshoring activity between 2010 and 2012, however, 
does not necessarily denote a decline in foreign direct 
investment by German companies, since it could simply 
be that, over this period, investment abroad was less 
often undertaken than previously to replace domestic 
production (Zanker et al, 2013).
At the same time, there was also a slight reduction in the 
proportion of companies involved in reshoring activities 
over this period, with only around 2% of them bringing 
production back to Germany, though this represents an 
increase relative to the companies involved in offshoring.
Figure 12: Share of German manufacturers that 
offshored and reshored production, 2004–2012
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Figure 9: Share of German manufacturing companies 
with production facilities abroad, by company size, 
2010–2012
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Just like the proportion involved in offshoring, the 
proportion of companies reshoring production over the 
period 2010–2012 varied significantly between sectors. 
The largest proportion was in the electrical equipment 
industry (7%), which also had one of the largest 
proportions of companies involved in offshoring (which 
again is consistent with the ERM data) (Figure 13). Some 
4% of companies in both the rubber and plastics and 
the chemicals industries brought production back from 
abroad (around half the proportion involved in offshoring), 
while 3% of motor vehicle manufacturers did so (less 
than a quarter of those that offshored production). The 
figures for companies in the electronics and the machinery 
and equipment industries bringing production back to 
Germany were even smaller relative to those involved in 
offshoring (2% as against 17% and 12%, respectively), 
while no textile manufacturer reported doing so, as 
against 17% that relocated production abroad. In general, 
therefore, reshoring in this period was on a relatively small 
scale relative to offshoring in most of the medium- to high-
tech sectors, except perhaps for the electrical equipment 
industry.
Figure 13: Share of German manufacturers that offshored 
and reshored production, by sector, 2010–2012
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UK
Although the data available on reshoring for the UK are 
less coherent than for Germany, a few surveys have been 
carried out that give an indication, at least, of its extent 
and how much it has changed recently. A survey carried 
out in 2013 (by the Engineering Employers’ Federation, 
EEF) of UK manufacturing companies that had offshored 
some of their production abroad in earlier years found 
that one in six of them has brought production back to 
the UK in the previous three years. This compares with 
one in seven found in a similar survey conducted five 
years previously in 2008–2009 (Harris, 2014), indicating 
an increase in reshoring more recently, albeit a relatively 
small one.
A survey of companies conducted in 2012 found that for 
two-thirds of companies, reshoring was not relevant for 
them. Of the third for which it was relevant, over half were 
either doing it or actively considering it. More specifically, 
around 16% of the companies surveyed had reshored 
some of their production and another 5% were actively 
considering doing so (Birmingham Post, 2013). Around 
half of the companies involved in reshoring had brought 
production back from China or India, a third from other 
Asian economies and just over 20% from other parts of 
Europe.
Figures from another survey carried out in 2103 (by the 
Manufacturing Advisory Service, MAS), which covered just 
over 530 SMEs from across England, found that 11% of the 
manufacturing companies among them were planning to 
reshore part of their production. Though the number is 
smaller than that found by the EEF survey, the MAS survey 
was confined to companies with fewer than 250 people 
employed. Moreover, the proportion was significantly 
larger than those planning to offshore, which amounted to 
just 4% (Harris, 2014).
Estimates of the additional employment created as 
a result of reshoring are relatively small. For example, 
at the beginning of 2014, the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry identified some 1,500 manufacturing jobs 
that had been reshored back to the UK since 2011 (UK 
Department of Trade and Industry, 2014).
As the author of the EEF report cited above noted, the 
survey does not show that manufacturers are moving 
production back to the UK faster than it is being moved 
away. The survey also found that the number of UK 
companies with some production overseas and the 
proportion of manufacturing that they do there were both 
larger than in 2004.
Reasons for reshoring
Germany
The EMS carried out in Germany also gives an indication 
of the reasons why some manufacturers have brought 
production back from abroad. These are summarised 
below along with a review of the factors identified in 
the literature and with reference to specific cases of 
companies involved in reshoring.
The responses to the 2012 survey suggest that the main 
reasons for reshoring production in the period 2010–2012 
were to achieve a higher degree of operational flexibility 
and more control over the quality of manufacture (Zanker 
et al, 2013) (Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Main reasons for reshoring reported by German manufacturers, 2010–2012
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Nearly 60% of the companies involved in reshoring and 
responding to the survey reported that offshoring had 
reduced the flexibility of their operation unduly and over 
half (53%) stated that it resulted in quality shortcomings. 
Both figures are around twice the proportion of companies 
reporting other reasons. The latter included the under-
utilisation of production capacity either abroad or in 
Germany (28%), increased transport costs (25%), perhaps 
related to higher energy prices, and the difficulties of 
coordinating operations (21%). The lack of skills and know-
how among the workforce, which feature prominently in 
the literature on reshoring, were reported by only 11%–
13% of respondents, while a similar proportion reported 
deficiencies in the infrastructure, and a small number (4%) 
referred to limited access to R&D. While the increasing 
wage bill in the host countries had been the decisive factor 
for a third of respondents for bringing production back to 
Germany in the 2007–2009 periods, it was the reason for 
only 6% in 2010–2012. This might reflect the effect of the 
crisis on wages in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia, where a large part of the foreign production 
capacity of German manufacturers is located.
UK
Evidence from the UK is very much in line with the German 
findings. According to the MAS survey cited above, the top 
three reasons for UK manufacturers bringing production 
back home were cost factors (rising labour costs in the 
countries concerned together with higher transport costs), 
quality control problems (or difficulties achieving the 
same product quality in low-labour-cost countries as in 
the UK) and the long lead times inherent in producing far 
away. An additional factor found by the other surveys was 
a desire among companies to locate production closer to 
consumer markets, not only to save on transport costs, 
but also to be better able to monitor demand and to 
react quickly to changes in this. Equally, importance was 
attached to the resilience of supply chains to ensure that 
orders could be met with a high degree of certainty within 
a specified period of time, which is often a problem when 
production takes place thousands of kilometres away.
At the same time, a survey of manufacturers carried out 
in 2011 found that there were obstacles to reshoring back 
to the UK, such as the high cost of labour; difficulties 
accessing finance to expand production facilities, 
especially in the wake of the financial crisis; and a shortage 
of skilled workers after decades of deindustrialisation, 
especially in SMEs (Braithwaite, 2012). The MAS survey 
also found that skills shortages were a significant factor, 
with nearly 1 in 10 respondents reporting this to be 
a concern.
Italy
A recent study of 38 companies in Italy involved in 
reshoring activities also tends to confirm the importance 
of the factors motivating the decision to bring production 
back from developing countries (Fratocchi et al, 2013). The 
most frequent reason reported (in 42% of cases) was the 
advantages to be gained by being able to put the ‘Made 
in Italy’ label on products, followed by the low quality of 
production in the countries concerned (mentioned in 24% 
of cases). The third most often reported reason (in 21% 
of cases) was the necessity of paying more attention to 
customer needs, which was difficult to do when products 
were manufactured far away. Other factors mentioned 
were the social pressure to produce in Italy and provide 
employment there (reported in 18% of cases); the higher 
skill level of Italian workers than those in developing 
countries (16%); the availability of unutilised production 
capacity domestically as a result of the economic crisis 
(13%); the reduction in the difference in labour costs 
between producing at home and abroad (13%); and 
increased transport costs (11%).
The various reasons for reshoring are explored in more 
detail below through reference to the literature as well as 
through specific examples of companies for which there 
are reports in the media.
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Operational flexibility
While offshoring can substantially reduce the labour costs of 
production, it also almost inevitably increases the difficulty 
of organising production, increases the time lags involved 
between orders being placed or decisions being taken 
to increase or reduce production in response to changes 
in market demand, and increases the time lags between 
production taking place and the output being delivered to 
customers. In addition, keeping transport costs down might 
require a minimum shipping size, which in turn might mean 
minimum order sizes and lengthy lead times for production, 
implying a loss of flexibility and responsiveness to market 
developments as well as problems in tailoring products to 
customer channel needs (Ferreira and Prokopets, 2009). 
Reshoring, therefore, represents a means of alleviating 
these problems and adjusting production more closely and 
promptly to customer demand (see Box 8 for examples).
Box 8: Reshoring to increase flexibility and cut delivery times
Germany
Wolfgang Reichelt, the owner of a successful block transformers electronics company in Lower Saxony that had 
relocated large parts of its production from Germany to China some years previously, brought production back to 
Germany in the first part of 2012, providing employment for 700 workers. The reason was an increasing need to achieve 
more flexibility in its operations and more responsiveness to customer demand. Producing in Germany instead of China 
was also reported to facilitate subcontracting (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2012).
Berndes, a manufacturer of pots and pans, relocated production back from China to the company’s home base in 
Arnsberg at the beginning of 2012 in order to increase flexibility and to enable the company to produce in shorter 
production runs and to produce a smaller volume of output of a particular line. In addition, a pot or pan carrying the 
‘Made in Germany’ label commands twice the price as one that says ‘Made in China’. The plan is to progressively bring 
70%–80% of production back to Arnsberg (DW, 2012).
France
Unowhy, an SME with 30 employees manufacturing Qooq, a touch tablet for use in cooking, began by producing screens 
in China when the product was launched in 2008, with the content (the recipes and videos) produced in France. While 
the product was immediately successful, the ability to deliver quickly and monitor production carefully was complicated 
because of the distance involved. Because of the difficulties (aircraft being full, the product being held back at the airport 
and so on), the company decided in 2012 to find a new contractor to produce the screens in France rather than China. It 
opted for Eolane, an electronics manufacturers based in Montceau-les-Mines, a former mining town in the Bourgogne 
region of eastern France. In addition to cutting delivery times and giving better control over production, the relocation 
also enabled improvements in the product to be made, according to the company (Chef d’entreprise.com, 2014).
La Mascotte, a manufacturer of sweaters, moved production from Roanne, in the Loire region of France, to Bulgaria 
and Morocco in 1995 in response to price competition from China. In 2001, the company changed its policy to focus on 
creativity and responding quickly to the latest fashion trends. This meant producing in small quantities to test the new 
line in shops, which could only be accomplished by moving production back to France. Six years later, the move had 
proved successful in the sense that the company was still in business, with 30 people employed directly and between 150 
and 200 employed via French subcontractors (Journal du Net, 2008a).
Mobilis Development, a company producing computer accessories, moved production to China in 2004. Although the 
company was satisfied that it had made the right decision initially, the disadvantages of the move soon became apparent. 
Large amounts of working capital were needed in order to pay for the goods produced before they were sold and 
sometimes even before they were received. It was also unable to respond to rush orders. According to the company’s co-
manager, delivery times tended to be random, so it was decided to bring back part of the production to the central region 
of France. This enabled the company to make prototypes for customers quickly and to work with the latter in co-designing 
products. The aim is to bring all of the production back to France in the near future, which is likely to mean expanding the 
current workforce of 100 (Chef d’entreprise.com, 2014).
Mauboussin, a company selling jewellery, relocated the production of its bestselling ring (with 2,500 sold each year) from 
India to a subcontractor in Lyon in France mainly to reduce delivery times from 45 days to 30 days. While the costs of 
producing the ring have risen because of higher labour costs, the rise is relatively small since most of the cost consists of 
the raw materials that the ring is made from (Journal du Net, 2014a).
Rossignol, a manufacturer of skis and other sports equipment, brought back production of skis from Taiwan to France 
in 2011. The costs of production would not be significantly higher, as 80% of the costs go towards raw material rather 
than labour, but delivery times, which were up to six months from placing an order, would be much shorter (at only two 
months between order and delivery). It would also be closer to its main market since the factory producing them is at the 
foot of Mont Blanc (Charbit, 2012).
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UK
RDM is a small engineering company, based in Coventry, producing components for the motor vehicles industry. It shifted 
production to China in the mid-2000s because of the low wages and other low costs there, but brought it back to the UK 
in 2013–2014. The main reason reported by the company was that the nature of the market had changed, with increasing 
personalisation of products to customer needs and an ongoing demand for faster delivery times. According to the chairperson, 
a supply chain that takes months to respond to orders is incompatible with the flexibility now required. In addition, the 
company’s specialist engineers are increasingly working with UK-based customers on special projects relating to vehicle design 
and technology. The company has, therefore, invested in new state-of-the-art machines and the latest CAD/CAM software in 
order to minimise production costs, which at the same time gives it the capability of offering ‘world-class’ prototyping services 
and producing to order in low volumes without a significant cost disadvantage. Some 25 new jobs were created by the initial 
move back to the UK (expanding the workforce to 38), and the company is forecasting an increase in sales of more than fourfold 
by 2018 with a diversification of sales to the aerospace, marine and other sectors (Coventry Telegraph, 2014).
Elite Electronic Systems, which makes equipment for Caterpillar, Chubb and Tyco among other large companies, decided 
in the mid-2000s to source cables from China that it had previously made at its base in Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, in order 
to reduce production costs. While the move worked well for a time, the onset of the recession in 2008–2009 highlighted 
the pitfalls of long supply chains. The company had placed an order immediately before the downturn in the market that 
it unsuccessfully tried to stop. It ended up holding 20 months of stock instead of the normal 1–2 months, which hit the 
company’s cash flow just as the financial crisis made it difficult to get credit. In addition, the remoteness of production caused 
problems making changes to products and prototyping, while lead times of 20 weeks or so made it difficult to respond to 
customer demands. The decision was made, therefore, to invest in more efficient equipment at its Enniskillen base and to 
bring production back to Northern Ireland, thus increasing its workforce to 185. According to one of the company’s directors, 
the initial decision to source cables form China was motivated partly by pressure from customers pointing to the cost savings 
they would be able to make by doing so. They carried out only a rudimentary analysis of the overall costs entailed, largely 
neglecting the less tangible ones (Telegraph, 2014).
Eaton Hydraulics, a US multinational employing 102,000 people worldwide, decided in 2014 to reshore production of its 
X20 piston pump from the US to its Havant site in the UK, thus creating up to 100 jobs over the next five years. The move will 
enable delivery times to be reduced to four to six weeks, which is half the industry standard, for orders from Europe, the 
Middle East and Africa as well as facilitating test programmes. The move was also motivated by the high standards of safety 
and product quality in the Havant plant (The Manufacturer, 2014a).
Bathrooms.com, a company specialising in online sales, decided in 2012 to begin manufacturing 25% of its products in the 
UK instead of China. The decision was motivated by a desire to reduce the time needed to bring products to the market. 
According to the company, the whole process from the initial design to the manufacture of the product for sale took up to 
six months in China, but using British manufacturers would reduce it to six weeks. This enabled the company to be a leader 
in design rather than a follower. In addition, the company expected the move to increase the speed of delivery to customers 
from 6–12 weeks in the case of products manufactured in China to 1–2 weeks for those made in the UK (Builders’ Merchants 
News, 2013).
Symington, a food manufacturer, relocated noodle production from China to a new factory (costing around €3 million) in 
Hunslet near Leeds in 2013. Noodles from the factory are used in around 100 different products (such as Golden Wonder), sold 
mainly in the UK. According to the company, moving noodle production to the UK shortened the supply chain considerably. 
Whereas it used to take 8–10 weeks to source noodles from China, delivery times were reduced to a week or two, thus 
enabling the company to be more responsive to customer orders. The move was reported to have created around 50 new 
jobs, including for skilled machine-tool operators whom the company trained specially in order to improve the production 
process. The company expected to create another 75 jobs during 2014 (FoodManufacture.co.uk, 2014).
Product quality
The evidence shows that in some cases the decisions on 
where to locate, or relocate, production are made without 
taking account of the possible effect on the quality of the 
product if the location is a country where labour costs 
are low, especially if it is far away from the company’s 
home base, where it might be difficult to exercise control 
over quality. The evidence also suggests that quality 
shortcomings became more important as a reason for 
reshoring production over the crisis period, perhaps, it 
has been argued, because of greater reluctance among 
companies to invest in quality management when finance 
is tight and the pressure to contain costs is extreme. When 
quality problems emerge, some companies might respond 
by bringing production back from the country in question 
rather than spending on setting up effective quality control 
systems (Zanker et al, 2013).
A case study carried out in 2011 of 11 companies in 
Germany that had recently reshored production confirms 
the importance of quality control problems as a reason for 
the decision (Leibl et al, 2011). Quality deficiencies were 
reported by seven of the companies as a major factor of 
producing in developing countries, especially China (see 
Box 9 for company examples).
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Box 9: Reshoring because of quality control problems
Germany
Steiff, a manufacturer of cuddly toys, decided to bring back all of the production of its Snuggle line of furry animals from 
China to Germany in 2010. Originally, the manufacture of a toy baby polar bear (Knut in Berlin Zoo) was located in China 
because the demand for the bear was higher than the company could handle in its Swabian factory. However, quality 
problems soon emerged, with wholes batches of toys having, for example, the eyes sewn on crooked. This, together with long 
delivery times, had the potential to damage the company’s reputation, and after a while, it became too much for the company 
to tolerate (Wirtschafts Woche, 2010).
Varta Microbatterie, a company producing micro batteries and employing around 1,300 people worldwide, with 600 
employed at its Ellwangen site, offshored part of its production as long ago as 1979. Button cell batteries were manufactured 
in Singapore, which was close to the strongest-growing market as well as offering low wage costs. Market research showed 
that customers rated quality and the performance of the button cells more than price to an increasing extent, so when the 
company needed to increase its production capacity in 2005, it looked for a location where it could best ensure that quality 
was high. Accordingly, it chose to expand in Germany rather than Singapore (Rueckverlagerung.de, 2006).
Wolf, a company based in Hallertau, Bavaria, was one of the first companies to bring the production of solar panels back to 
Germany in 2007. A prime factor behind the move was to be able to put the ‘Made in Germany’ label on its products. Quality 
deficiencies were also a significant problem when producing in the Czech Republic. In addition, the lower wage costs were 
offset by the higher costs of logistics and the infrastructure needed. According to the company, it decided to produce only in 
Germany, a decision that also represented a commitment to corporate social responsibility. It also expressed the view that 
robotics and creativity would compensate for the higher wage bill involved and that the production of solar collectors was 
increasingly reliant on the use of robots (n-TV.de, 2007).
France
Geneviève Lethu, a manufacturer of tableware, brought back much of its production of knives, towels and tablecloths from 
Asia to France in 2009, reducing the amount produced abroad from 40% to 10%. While big increases in the price of energy, raw 
materials and transport were factors, the main reason was to obtain more control over product quality and to be able to put 
the ‘Made in France’ label on products, especially for the US and Australian markets. Although producing in France is between 
15% and 50% more expensive than doing so in China, depending on the product, quality problems sometimes meant that 
half of a container was unusable. Reshoring nevertheless, gave rise to specific problems of its own in that it took some time 
for the company to find competent subcontractors in France to manufacture the products because of the decline in the 
industry (Charbit, 2012).
Del Ing, a company set up in 2010 to produce LED bulbs, started off by manufacturing its products in China. In January 2014, 
the company relocated 70% of its production to Lannion in France because transport costs and customs duties had increased, 
and more importantly, because the quality of the products had become problematic. Although labour costs were higher in 
France, the company was able to remain competitive as a result of better quality, more flexibility and proximity to the market 
(France 3 Bretagne, 2014; 20 Minutes, 2014).
Sart Von Rhor, a manufacturer of valves and tapes for large industrial plants, based in Alsace, relatively recently relocated 
part of its production to Asia in order to reduce costs. It quickly reversed the decision, mainly for reasons of quality control, 
which led to significant wastage and the need to recycle materials, as well as potential damage to the company’s reputation. 
Adding transport costs and delivery delays that sometimes meant transporting products by aircraft, the company calculated 
that it was more economic to produce domestically. The company planned to double the size of its plant in 2014 and may 
begin to export (Journal du Net, 2014b).
UK
Laxtons Ltd is a manufacturer of wool worsted yarns for the clothing, upholstery and carpet industries. Established in 1907, 
at its peak it operated one of the biggest spinning mills in Europe, employing nearly 600 people. It closed its UK operations in 
2001 and moved to lower-cost sites in Spain and Italy. In 2010, the company returned to the UK to set up a new wool worsted 
manufacturing facility in Guiseley, near Leeds, the first new factory of its kind in the UK for 25 years and one featuring the 
latest specialist yarn-spinning technology, with a workforce of 12. The move was motivated by a decision to concentrate on 
the middle and upper ends of the market, on design and on high-quality products. According to the company, it is impossible 
to compete in the mass market for textiles, with producers constantly seeking the lowest-cost locations and moving from 
eastern Europe and China, where labour and shipping costs have risen substantially and quality is still very unpredictable, to 
India and other Asian countries, such as Cambodia, as well as Turkey. In its view, therefore, UK manufacturing has to be based 
on niche markets, flexible production runs, high quality and innovation. By producing locally, the time from designing a new 
product to bulk production could be reduced to a matter of weeks rather than up to 12 months, which was previously the 
case. In addition, as the only worsted spinner in the UK licensed to use the Woolmark logo, Laxtons enjoys a major advantage 
in domestic and overseas markets since it lends a guarantee of quality to its product beyond the company’s own reputation 
(Leeds Manufacturing Forum, 2013).
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Mediplus, a family-run business based in High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, which produces medical devices and 
equipment, decided at the beginning of 2014 to bring its manufacturing operations back from North Africa and France to 
the UK. The company expected that move that would lead to the creation of 25 new jobs, almost doubling its workforce 
of 30. According to the company’s managing director, the move was in large part a response to the increasing regulation 
of the products it manufactures, which necessitate close control over the processes carried out by subcontractors. 
Producing in-house would enable the company to exercise more quality control over its output (The Manufacturer, 
2014b).
Transport costs
In recent years, rising fuel prices, increasing congestion 
and bottlenecks in logistics have pushed up transport 
costs substantially and reduced the potential savings 
from offshoring. The freight costs of transporting goods 
by sea have climbed rapidly as the growth in demand has 
outpaced the expansion of capacity, increasing by 135% 
between 2005 and 2008 (Ferreira and Prokopets, 2009). 
This has caused companies to rethink their supply chain 
strategy (Goel et al, 2008; Leibl et al, 2011), especially 
companies producing bulky products with low unit value.
A survey in 2013, by the French Ministry for Industrial 
Renewal, of 30 companies in France that had brought 
production back from abroad confirms the importance of 
increased transport costs as a factor behind the decision: 
two-thirds of the companies surveyed referred to this as 
a major reason (Ministère du Redressement Productif, 
2013) (see Box 10 for specific examples).
Box 10: Reshoring because of high transport costs
France
Majencia, a company producing office furniture, relocated production to China in the early 2000s. A big increase in 
transport costs because of higher oil prices, which halved the overall cost saving of producing in China from 20% to 10%, 
had recently persuaded it to bring production back to Noyon in Picardy – initially part and then all of it. In addition, 
the drop in sales during the economic crisis meant that its sales were not enough to keep its workforce employed 
domestically, so it was a choice of paying either for transport or wages. Producing in France has enabled the company 
to become more responsive and flexible to customer demands, as well as being able to put the ‘Made in France’ label on 
products (Journal du Net, 2014c).
Loiselet, a company producing metal goods, offshored its foundry from France to Tianjin, south of Peking, in 2001 
in order to reduce production costs. Although this was achieved, by 2012 the costs of transport had risen to such an 
extent (to €1 million a year) that, combined with defects in the products, it offset any savings. It was therefore decided 
to relocate the foundry to Dreux in the central region of France. Around €15 million was invested in new machinery to 
automate production, which enabled the wage bill to be reduced substantially, as 600 workers in China were replaced by 
just 84 employees in France (France Info, 2013).
Aquaproduction, a manufacturer of showers, offshored the production of shower walls to Romania in 2003 in a factory 
employing 40 people, to take advantage of low labour costs for a labour -intensive activity. However, after two years, 
when the production line needed renewing, the decision was taken to bring production back to France, to Chéméré, 
a small town in Pays de la Loire, and to invest in more automation in the plant to compensate for the lower wage costs in 
Romania. The fact that there were also big savings in transport costs, which were high because of the bulky nature of the 
product, meant that overall costs of production were no higher than in Romania (Journal du Net, 2008b).
Samas, a manufacturer of office furniture, needed to restructure its operations several years ago in order to continue 
operating. The choice was either to expand production in China, where part of its production was already located, and 
close down the plants in France, or to bring all of the production back to France. It chose the second option, firstly, 
because half of the cost gain from producing in China, which amounted to around 20%, was absorbed by transport costs, 
and the additional 10% could be compensated for by better organisation of work. Secondly, the time between orders 
and deliveries could be reduced to four or five days, compared to eight weeks in China (Journal du Net, 2008c).
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Production capacity
Reshoring has been motivated in several cases by the 
following:
¢ a desire to increase production relative to capacity in 
domestic plants or factories during times of economic 
downturn to avoid making workers redundant and to 
save on fixed costs;
¢ problems of expanding capacity in low-labour-cost 
countries because, for example, of a lack of know-how.
In practice, when production capacity worldwide exceeds 
demand and there is a need for rationalisation, which is 
most economically achieved by concentration in a single 
plant, companies rarely, if ever, choose to do this in the plant 
abroad rather than the one at home (see Box 11 for specific 
examples).
Labour costs
It is widely recognised that the difference in labour 
costs between Europe and China and other developing 
countries – the primary reason for offshoring production – 
is narrowing progressively if specific allowance is made 
for differences in labour productivity (see, for example, 
Ritter and Sternfels, 2004; Leibl et al, 2009; Powell, 2011). 
In a Boston Consulting Group White Paper published 
a few years ago, Sirkin et al (2012) predicted that by 
2015, adjusted labour costs in the more industrialised 
areas of China, such as the Yangtze River Delta, would 
be around 69% of US costs, as against 31% in 2010. The 
continuing spread of automation is likely to reduce the 
cost differential further.
While rising labour costs in China and similar countries 
clearly affect decisions of where to locate the production of 
labour-intensive commodities, it does not necessarily follow 
that this will lead to reshoring. Instead, the typical response, 
as indicated above by the review of ERM cases, is to move 
production to even lower-cost locations, to countries 
that are at an even earlier stage of development, such as 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia or Vietnam.
There are, nevertheless, some examples of companies, 
described in Box 12, for which the decision to bring 
production back to the home country is reported to be 
based on the erosion of labour cost differences.
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Box 11: Reshoring because of production capacity problems
Germany
Stihl, a Swabian family business making chainsaws, decided to bring back a large part of production to its headquarters 
near Stuttgart from Brazil in 2010. A major reason was to be able to increase the output of the domestic plant and so 
preserve jobs. However, there were other reasons, too. In particular, the Brazilian currency had appreciated in value, 
thus increasing costs in terms of US dollars or euro of both labour and transport (Wirtschafts Woche, 2010).
France
Haworth, a manufacturer of office furniture, had so much success with its Epure line that production could not keep 
up with the orders. The expansion of production that was required, however, was difficult to achieve in its Chinese 
plant because of a lack of know-how and because of difficulties operating the equipment needed. Accordingly, the 
manufacture of the foundry pieces that went into the desks, which up to then were made in China, was subcontracted 
instead to a company in Loire-Atlantique. This company was used to producing for the motor vehicle industry and had 
the sophisticated machine tools needed to meet the company’s requirements. While it was more expensive to produce 
in France in terms of labour costs, this was compensated for by the use of a more productive technology. A second 
advantage was the proximity to the company’s own site, which meant a significant saving in transport costs (Journal du 
Net, 2008d).
Renault Trucks, with headquarters in Lyon, terminated its contract with the Turkish manufacturer Karsan in 2013 in 
order to be able to increase the capacity utilisation of the company’s two plants in the Rhône-Alpes region of France, 
where the workers were facing a lengthy period of partial employment. The decision was also linked to new European 
anti-pollution standards (Rue89Lyon, 2013).
Eminence, the leading producer of men’s underwear in France, reduced purchases from subcontractors in Tunisia, 
Morocco, Egypt and Asia in 2012 in order to maintain employment at its French factories and to avoid part-time 
working in the face of a large reduction in orders. The decision enabled the company to run its two factories in France, 
together employing 250 workers, at full capacity. Although it meant some reduction in profits, the company said this 
was preferable to losing qualified workers, who would be difficult to replace in the future, if they were needed, because 
of a lack of young people being trained as a result of the virtual disappearance of textile manufacturing in France (Les 
Echos, 2013).
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Box 12: Reshoring due to falling cost advantages
Germany
Simba-Dickie, a family-owned company making toys, shifted production to China in 1984, one of the first companies to do 
so. In 2011, it decided to bring production back to Germany essentially because cost differences were gradually shrinking 
due to rising wages in China and because of increases in transport costs. Producing in China instead of Germany was 
considered to be less and less justified in terms of costs (Bild, 2011).
Fackelmann, a manufacturer of household goods, terminated production in China in 2011, with a loss of at least 1,000 jobs 
(a third of the company’s global workforce), and expanded production in Germany to partly compensate. The decision is 
reported to have been mainly motivated by increasing labour costs. According to the owner, ‘the times are over when China 
can be regarded as a cheap work bench’ (Nordbayern, 2012).
UK
Hornby, a leading manufacturer of model toys, decided to relocate 60% of the production of its Humbrol enamel paints 
from China, where they had been produced for 10 years, back to the UK in 2012. The decision was made after comparing the 
prices offered by companies in the UK with those in China and India and was prompted by the rising costs of labour in China, 
which, according to the company, had trebled in the previous seven years and was set to double again in the coming decade. 
After taking account of the higher costs of transport, it was considered that the cost advantage of sourcing supply from China 
was negligible. In addition, a location much closer to its UK head office in Kent offered far shorter delivery times and more 
control over quality (Telegraph, 2012a).
Caldeira, a textile manufacturer making cushions that is based in Merseyside, opened a factory in the Zhejiang province in 
China in 2004 and moved half of its production there to keep costs down at a time when wages were only a tenth of those 
in the UK and the exchange rate was favourable. In 2012, it decided to bring the production back to Merseyside because 
the difference in costs of producing in China as opposed to the UK had become insignificant. Over the eight years since 
2004, the wages of the workers employed by the company in China had risen by 400%, while shipping costs and duties 
had also risen, and the Chinese yuan exchange rate had appreciated substantially. While wages in the UK were still higher 
than in China, even though the company paid only slightly above the minimum wage, this was compensated for by higher 
productivity levels. Labour costs could have been reduced by moving to a country with even lower wages, such as Vietnam 
or Bangladesh, but since the raw materials come from China, this would have entailed increased transport costs as well as 
the added complications of producing in a less developed country. The company, however, has faced difficulty in Merseyside 
in recruiting skilled machinists who are willing to work for the low wages offered, although this was also a problem in the 
industrial regions of China because of the increasing competition among companies for staff. Many of the workers taken on 
are in their fifties and sixties, who trained as apprentices in the 1970s and 1980s; the necessary skills have not been widely 
taught since then (CNN, 2012; Telegraph, 2012b).
R&D and innovation
Since manufacturing tends to be central to innovation and 
economic competitiveness, there is – and, indeed, should 
be – a great deal of concern when production is offshored 
and, even more so, when it involves an R&D capacity, which 
is central to innovation. The link between production and 
R&D or innovation, however, is complex and differs between 
industries. While in some industries R&D and production 
do not necessarily need to be carried out in the same place, 
in other industries, or segments of industries, R&D is most 
effective when undertaken in close proximity to production; 
indeed, in some cases the two need to take place together. 
The extent to which this is the case also depends on the 
type of R&D or the phase of production it relates to. For 
process development, for example, proximity to production 
is typically very important. Equally, the incorporation of new 
designs into production typically requires close collaboration 
at plant level with machine tool suppliers. The more 
advanced and intricate the product, the more such direct 
involvement is important, whereas in industries in which 
production processes are relatively simple and R&D intensity 
is low, production and R&D can more easily be separated.
There are a number of examples of companies in France 
that reshored production in order to improve the conditions 
for R&D and innovation to take place in, although this was 
usually not the only reason (see Box 13).
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Box 13: Reshoring to facilitate innovation
TEB, a manufacturer of video surveillance equipment employing 90 people, decided in 2006 to adopt a more 
technologically oriented approach by concentrating on producing higher-quality, high-definition products. At the time, 
half of its output was produced in China, which was not conducive to the close monitoring and control over prototypes 
that was needed. The company, therefore, relocated production back to France in 2009 when it launched its new robotic 
camera and selected a French subcontractor to help with this. The additional production costs involved were reported 
not to be significant, and the responsiveness to customer orders greatly improved (Chef d’entreprise.com, 2014).
Veloscot, a small company making electric bicycles, initially got the idea for the product from China and adapted it 
for the French market in 2006. After five years of producing in China, the company relocated manufacture to France 
for practical reasons. Since producing an electric bike is complicated and involves over 300 separate pieces, it was 
considered much easier to carry out user-driven innovation in France than in China. Equally, it was possible to put the 
‘Made in France’ label on the cycle (Chef d’entreprise.com, 2014).
Atol, a manufacturer of eyewear, decided in 2007 to start bringing back production from China to the Jura for reasons 
relating to innovation. Specifically, it was considered that R&D capacity was better in France than in China and that being 
located in France enabled the company to react more quickly to market developments. According to the company, which 
sells its output only in France, proximity to the customer is crucial, as demand changes very fast and the production line 
must be capable of adapting quickly to the changes. Equally, although wages in China are only a fraction of what they 
are in France, this is offset by much lower levels of productivity in China and the capacity to innovate in France (Charbit, 
2012).
Decathlon, a larger retailer of sports goods that manufactures many of the products it sells, has in recent years brought 
a significant part of its production back from Southeast Asia to France, specifically to Lille, where the site covers over 
180,000 square metres and where the company’s B’Twin cycle is assembled. The prototypes are designed there, R&D is 
carried out and the products are tested before being marketed. A major problem of locating R&D in Southeast Asia was 
maintaining control of the copyright, which is not an issue in northern France. In addition, producing in Lille allows the 
company to put the ‘Made in France’ label on the cycles, which adds to their attractiveness on the market, as well as 
enabling the company to maintain domestic employment levels and so discharge its social responsibility (Charbit, 2012).
Other aspects
Given the advantages listed above of producing 
domestically, the question arises as to why companies 
would choose to offshore in the first place. As indicated 
earlier, the extent of offshoring continues to be significant 
and appears to be several times the scale of reshoring. 
One answer is that economic conditions have changed 
over time and, for certain types of product, the increases 
in energy and transport costs that have occurred alongside 
the rise in wages in developing countries like China have 
altered the calculation. As also noted above, however, 
rising wages in the countries to which production has 
tended to be offshored in the past does not necessarily 
constitute a case for bringing production back home, but 
rather for seeking other locations where wages remain 
low, assuming that labour costs are the determining factor 
behind location decisions (in other words, other factors are 
less important).
Another answer is that companies simply miscalculated 
the gains from locating in low-labour-cost countries when 
they made the decision to offshore. According to a survey 
of US manufacturers carried out a few years ago, 60% of 
companies that opted for producing abroad based their 
decision on rudimentary calculations of costs, ignoring the 
‘soft’ or less tangible elements (Ferreira and Prokopets, 
2009). They, therefore, took account only of the most 
easily available cost items, such as wages, and so obtained 
a distorted picture of the relative cost of producing in 
different places and organising manufacture in different 
ways. They neglected the loss of ability to respond quickly 
to customer demands and to customise products to these, 
as well as quality control problems.
The fact that cost savings tend to be overestimated in 
many cases when the initial decision to relocate is made 
is indicated by the results of the EMS for Germany. These 
show that, on average, one in every four decisions to 
offshore production is followed within three to five years 
by an opposite decision to bring at least part of the 
production back again. Moreover, a study of 39 German 
manufacturing companies revealed that 85% of companies 
reporting that they had decided to reshore all or part of 
their production had offshored manufacturing activities 
only four to five years previously (Kinkel and Maloca, 2009). 
This suggests that reshoring decisions can be regarded 
as much as corrections to previous misjudgements about 
the relative advantages of offshoring to the countries 
concerned as responses to changes in local factors.
Conclusion
Although there is a limited amount of data on the scale 
of reshoring and the way that it is changing over time, 
especially in Europe, the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the relatively piecemeal evidence available is that 
so far the extent is modest, and, while it seems to be 
increasing, it is doing so slowly. This, at least, is what 
the surveys undertaken and the specific cases that have 
been publicised indicate in Germany, France and the UK. 
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In Germany, for example, only 2%–3% of manufacturers 
engaged in reshoring over the period 2010–-2012, which 
was much the same as over the preceding 10 years or 
so, although the proportion may have risen since then. 
In the UK, while there seems to have been an increase in 
companies with production abroad reshoring between 
2008 and 2013, the extent was small.
There is a need, however, for a word of caution. The large 
majority of cases of companies bringing back production 
from abroad that can be identified from the media, and 
more specifically from the internet, relate to companies 
that are relatively small, with fewer than 100 people 
employed. But it would be misguided to assume that these 
cases are representative of the reshoring that is occurring. 
As noted above, large companies do not necessarily 
publicise the fact that they have reshored production 
for a number of possible reasons: they may not want 
to advertise their strategy to competitors; they may be 
unwilling to admit to a past miscalculation; or it might be 
difficult to recognise when it has actually happened, in 
cases where it is the outcome of multinationals deciding 
in which of their plants across the world to expand 
production and where to contract it.
At the same time, reshoring seems to be occurring over 
a wide range of industries and is not confined to any 
particular kind of product. Although in Germany, there 
seem be relatively few cases in the more basic industries, 
such as textiles or food and beverages, this is not so in 
France or the UK, where there are examples of companies 
producing relatively basic products, such as textiles, and 
bringing their manufacture back to the domestic economy, 
though often with a focus on the upper end of the market.
The motives for re-shoring are numerous. The competitive 
need to reduce delivery times, to respond to market 
developments and to collaborate closely with trade 
customers as well as to ensure the quality of what is 
produced seem to have become more important factors 
affecting locational decisions. In addition, big increases in 
wages in China and other rapidly developing economies 
and in transport costs as a result of higher energy prices, 
together with unfavourable movements in currency 
exchange rates, appear to have played a role.
Moreover, it is important to recognise that offshoring has 
continued to take place and probably on a larger scale 
than reshoring. Although the scale seems to have declined 
over the period 2010–-2011 (according to both the EMS 
in Germany and the ERM), it appears to have picked up 
again in the last two years (according to the ERM). While 
this is true of Germany, it does not seem to have occurred 
in France or the UK, where (according to the ERM) the job 
losses from offshoring seem to have declined markedly 
since 2012.
Whatever the motives behind reshoring, there still 
seems to be factors encouraging companies to offshore 
production, increasingly, it seems, to countries with lower 
wages than China and, in particular, industries where 
manufacturing is highly labour -intensive. Equally, it is 
important to bear in mind that the production offshored 
is not only destined to be sold in the domestic or other 
European markets – much of the output produced is 
for the market in the country or wider region to which 
production has been offshored. It is unlikely that this 
part of the production will be returned to the domestic 
economy. It is this part, moreover, that it is likely to have 
been expanding most given the much faster rate of growth 
of the economies concerned than the EU over the past few 
years.
It should also be borne in mind that while the lack of skills 
in these countries is one of the factors underlying the 
decisions of companies to reshore production, it is also the 
case that similar shortages seem to exist in manufacturing 
in the domestic economy as well, especially in the more 
basic industries, which in the UK in particular, though 
also in France, if to a lesser extent, have experienced 
a large-scale decline over the past 30–40 years. Alleviating 
the shortage depends not only on providing the training 
required for people to acquire the skills in question, but 
arguably also on companies being able and willing to pay 
the wages to attract people to take up the jobs concerned, 
which may be difficult, given the competition faced from 
companies still manufacturing products in low-wage 
countries.
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Annex 1: NACE sector divisions
Table A1: NACE Rev. 2 sector divisions, with short and full titles
NACE 
division
Short title Full title
1 Agriculture Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
2 Forestry Forestry and logging
3 Fishing Fishing and aquaculture
5 Mining of coal Mining of coal and lignite
6 Oil and gas extraction Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
7 Mining of iron Mining of metal ores
8 Other mining Other mining and quarrying
9 Mining support Mining support service activities
10 Manufacture: food Manufacture of food products
11 Manufacture: beverages Manufacture of beverages
12 Manufacture: tobacco Manufacture of tobacco products
13 Manufacture: textiles Manufacture of textiles
14 Manufacture: clothing Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture: leather Manufacture of leather and related products
16 Manufacture: wood products Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
17 Manufacture: paper products Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Manufacture: printing and recorded media Printing and reproduction of recorded media
19 Manufacture: coke and petrol products Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture: chemicals Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
21 Manufacture: pharmaceuticals Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations
22 Manufacture: rubber/plastic Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture: other non-metallic mineral 
products
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture: basic metals Manufacture of basic metals
25 Manufacture: fabricated metal products Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment
26 Manufacture: computer, electronic and optical Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture: electrical Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture: machinery and equipment Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture: motor vehicles Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture: other transport equipment Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture: furniture Manufacture of furniture
32 Manufacture: other Other manufacturing
33 Repair or installation of machinery Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
35 Electricity, gas, etc. supply Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36 Water collection, treatment and supply Water collection, treatment and supply
37 Sewerage Sewerage
38 Waste collection and treatment Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery
39 Other waste management services Remediation activities and other waste management services
41 Construction Construction of buildings
42 Civil engineering Civil engineering
43 Specialised construction activities Specialised construction activities
45 Wholesale/retail of motor vehicles, etc. Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
46 Wholesale, except motor vehicles Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
47 Retail, except motor vehicles Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
49 Land transport Land transport and transport via pipelines
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NACE 
division
Short title Full title
50 Water transport Water transport
51 Air transport Air transport
52 Warehousing and transport support activities Warehousing and support activities for transportation
53 Postal and courier activities Postal and courier activities
55 Accommodation Accommodation
56 Food and beverage services Food and beverage service activities
58 Publishing Publishing activities
59 TV, film and music production Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound 
recording and music publishing activities
60 Broadcasting Programming and broadcasting activities
61 Telecoms Telecommunications
62 Computer programming, consultancy, etc. Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
63 Information services Information service activities
64 Financial services, except insurance and pensions Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
65 Insurance and pensions Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social 
security
66 Auxiliary financial services Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
68 Real estate activities Real estate activities
69 Legal and accounting activities Legal and accounting activities
70 Head office, management consultancy activities Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
71 Architectural and engineering activities Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
72 Scientific R&D Scientific research and development
73 Advertising and market research Advertising and market research
74 Other professional and scientific activities Other professional, scientific and technical activities
75 Veterinary activities Veterinary activities
77 Rental and leasing activities Rental and leasing activities
78 Employment activities Employment activities
79 Travel agencies, etc. Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related 
activities
80 Security and investigation activities Security and investigation activities
81 Building services and landscaping Services to buildings and landscape activities
82 Office and business support activities Office administrative, office support and other business support 
activities
84 Public administration, defence and social 
security
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
85 Education Education
86 Health Human health activities
87 Residential care Residential care activities
88 Social work Social work activities without accommodation
90 Creative, arts and entertainment Creative, arts and entertainment activities
91 Libraries, museums, etc. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities
92 Gambling Gambling and betting activities
93 Sports and recreation Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
94 Membership organisations Activities of membership organisations
95 Repair of computers and appliances Repair of computers and personal and household goods
96 Other personal services Other personal service activities
97 Domestic services Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel
98 Private household activities Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private 
households for own use
99 Extraterritorial organisations Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies
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Annex 2:  Employment levels by sector
Table A2: Employment (in thousands) by sector division, EU28, 2008–2016
NACE Rev. 2.0 Employment (000s)
Letter 
code
Sector Divisions 
(total=88)
2008 2016 Change % change
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1–3  11,308  9,298 -2010 -18
B Mining and quarrying 5–9  886  808 -78 -9
C Manufacturing, of which: 10–33  37,990  34,218 -3773 -10
CA Food, beverages and tobacco products 10–12  5,092  5,024 -68 -1
CB Textiles, clothing and leather products 13–15  3,329  2,305 -1024 -31
CC Wood, paper and printing 16–18  3,323  2,469 -855 -26
CD Coke and petroleum products. 19  246  179 -67 -27
CE Chemicals 20  1,470  1,330 -140 -9
CF Pharmaceuticals 21  799  829 30 4
CG Rubber and plastics products 22–23  3,356  2,939 -418 -12
CH Basic metals and metal products 24–25  5,706  4,798 -908 -16
CI Computers, electronic and optical products 26  1,712  1,501 -211 -12
CJ Electrical equipment 27  1,601  1,405 -196 -12
CK Machinery and equipment 28  3,334  3,417 83 2
CL Motor vehicles and transport equipment 29–30  4,217  4,367 150 4
CM Furniture and other products and repair 31–33  3,805  3,655 -150 -4
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 35  1,496  1,550 53 4
E Water supply, sewerage, waste, etc. 36–39  1,584  1,629 45 3
F Construction 41–43  18,491  14,577 -3914 -21
G Wholesale and retail 45–47  31,408  31,053 -355 -1
H Transportation and storage 49–53  11,489  11,638 149 1
I Accommodation and food service activities 55–56  9,189  10,272 1083 12
JA Publishing and broadcasting 58–60  1,999  2,006 8 0
JB Telecommunications 61  1,451  1,102 -349 -24
JC IT and information services 62–63  2,737  3,584 847 31
K Financial and insurance activities 64–66  6,579  6,555 -24 0
L Real estate activities 68  1,687  1,853 166 10
MA Legal, accounting, architecture, engineering, etc 69–71  7,470  8,695 1225 16
MB Scientific research and development 72  832  938 106 13
MC Other professional, scientific and technical 
activities
73–75  2,146  2,734 587 27
N Administrative and support service activities 77–82  7,953  9,315 1362 17
O Public administration and defence 84  15,550  15,196 -354 -2
P Education 85  15,603  17,156 1552 10
QA Human health services 86  12,538  13,817 1279 10
QB Residential care and social work 87–88  8,374  10,322 1948 23
R Arts and entertainment 90–93  3,374  3,790 416 12
S/U Other service activities and extraterritorial 
organisations
94–96,99  5,567  5,585 18 0
T Activities of households 97–98  2,505  2,304 -201 -8
Non-response  664  1,394 730
Source: EU–LFS
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The 2016 annual report from the European 
Restructuring Monitor (ERM) provides 
evidence of the employment impact of 
recent restructuring activity in Europe based 
on the European Union Labour Force Survey 
(EU-LFS) and the ERM events database. The 
thematic part of this year’s report centres on 
trends in both the offshoring and reshoring 
activity of companies in Europe, with a focus 
on the manufacturing sector. ERM data 
indicates that offshoring has never been 
a large source of job loss in Europe, and 
the analysis finds that offshoring started 
to decline after the global financial crisis 
and has yet to recover. It also finds that 
offshoring has increased in eastern Europe 
while it has declined in western Europe. 
Evidence of reshoring is limited; what 
evidence exists suggests that it is a relatively 
minor phenomenon.
The European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite 
European Union Agency, whose role is to 
provide knowledge in the area of social, 
employment and work-related policies. 
Eurofound was established in 1975 by 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75, to 
contribute to the planning and design of 
better living and working  conditions in 
Europe. 
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